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Check Point Research header art: a heavy steel door swinging open in a dark server room, with red light spilling from the racks behind it.
Image: Check Point Research (fair use). Header art from the Check Point Research post "PHP2Shell Exploitation on Check Point Gateway," published Nov. 12, 2026.

Detection

Check Point Research Says Attackers Used PHP2Shell and a Root Exploit on Unpatched Check Point Gateways, Planted an Implant Built From an Ivanti Toolkit and Wiped VMware ESXi Hosts at Some Israeli Victims

The first wave hit Israeli organizations on Oct. 30, about a week after a fix was available, and a broader wave followed on Nov. 2. The gateway artifacts, from zz-prefixed template webshells to a listener on TCP port 11072, give defenders concrete places to look.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon6 min read

LONDON - An attacker broke into unpatched Check Point Security Gateways through their Mobile Access portals, escalated to root with a second flaw, installed a backdoor derived from a toolkit previously seen on Ivanti appliances and, at some Israeli victims, pivoted to VMware ESXi hosts and ran a wiper, Check Point Research said in an analysis of the campaign.

Exploitation began on Oct. 30, roughly one week after a security fix became available, from 130.94.19[.]204, and that first wave targeted Israeli organizations. A second scanning wave on Nov. 2 returned to some of the same Israeli targets and added organizations worldwide, with no sign of destructive activity. Neither wave showed a sector preference, which Check Point said points to opportunistic initial-access attempts.

From portal to root to ESXi

The entry point was PHP2Shell, the PHP flaws tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. On the gateways, the first traces were PHP session files under /opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/ containing an upload_progress_pwn marker, along with hundreds of segmentation faults in the portal's Apache and PHP workers, evidence of repeated exploitation attempts. The attacker then exploited CVE-2026-123039, a local privilege-escalation bug in the gateway's DynamicCLI IPC interface, to move from the portal service account to root.

Check Point Research infection chain diagram: an attacker at 130.94.19.204 exploits a gateway with PHP2Shell, escalates through DynamicCLI, deploys a PHP webshell and the TSGA gateway implant, which drops the TSProxy module, then moves over SSH to wipe ESXi.
Image: Check Point Research (fair use).Figure 1 from the Check Point Research post, the infection chain.

With root, the attacker wrote PHP webshells into the template directory the portal uses to build its login pages, as files matching zz*.tpl. Each began as a small command shell and was replaced with a fuller version that requires the hard-coded key zz2026 and supports system commands, PHP evaluation and uploads, which land at /tmp/.up.tpl. The attacker copied one upload into the portal as challenge_render.tpl.

Next came a standalone backdoor that Check Point calls TSGA, launched as /tmp/CPconfigdaemon with output sent to /tmp/.bd.log. Running as root, it relaunches itself as slot_CPconfigdaemon in the boot persistence directory and drops TSProxy, a shared library written to /lib/libcpfwcommon.so and injected into appliance processes, where it intercepts networking functions to handle specially marked attacker connections while passing ordinary traffic. TSGA offers encrypted remote access, configuration theft, persistence in backups and snapshots, process injection and tampering with binary firewall logs.

Check Point Research screenshot of the expanded PHP webshell source, which checks a key parameter, decodes XOR-obfuscated commands, runs system and eval calls and saves uploads to /tmp/.up.tpl.
Image: Check Point Research (fair use).Figure 3 from the Check Point Research post, the webshell code.

From the gateway, the attacker ran the gogo scanner to map internal assets, then moved over SSH to an ESXi host using the vpxuser service account, staged the destroy_v6 wiper in /tmp and ran it. The Linux wiper walks a target directory, overwrites files with zeros by default before deleting them, and drops a politically themed note, DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt, in each directory it processes. The note uses the brand of Dream Security, which had recently published research on PHP2Shell exploitation of Palo Alto Networks devices by China-nexus actors; Check Point said the timing raises the possibility of retaliation but the evidence does not establish a motive.

An attribution Check Point will not settle

TSGA and TSProxy are modified variants of PhiliKit, a passive backdoor and installer for Ivanti VPN appliances that ESET has associated with the China-nexus group UNC5221. The links are close: both TSGA and PhiliKit grew from Tiny SHell and use encrypted communications on TCP port 11072 and the Unix socket /tmp/.p_sock, and TSProxy shares operator credentials, transport secrets, three activation-selector digests and the same TLS certificate and private key with PhiliKit's networking library. The gogo scanner and the LightNode VPS hosting have also been tied to China-nexus activity, and scanning clustered between 00:00 and 09:00 UTC, Chinese working hours.

Check Point Research bar chart of scanning activity by hour of day in UTC, concentrated between midnight and 09:00.
Image: Check Point Research (fair use).Scanning activity by hour of day (UTC), from the Check Point Research post.

But destruction, a focus on Israel and a Hebrew note about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do not fit UNC5221's known interests, the researchers wrote. They laid out several possibilities: the actor ran the whole campaign, acted only as an initial access broker, or staged a false flag, and the wiping may have been a smoke screen.

Where to look

For Check Point gateway owners, the report reads as a checklist. Confirm the PHP2Shell and CVE-2026-123039 fixes are installed on every gateway with Mobile Access enabled, then hunt regardless of patch date, since the first wave came about a week after the fix. Look for session files with upload_progress_pwn under the CPcvpn tmp directory and for bursts of Apache or PHP segmentation faults around Oct. 30 and Nov. 2; template files named zz*.tpl or an unexpected challenge_render.tpl; /tmp/.up.tpl, /tmp/.bd.log, /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, a process named slot_CPconfigdaemon and the library /lib/libcpfwcommon.so; and a listener on TCP 11072 or the socket /tmp/.p_sock. Because TSGA can tamper with firewall logs and persist in backups and snapshots, a compromised gateway's own logs and restore points cannot be trusted on their own.

Beyond the gateway, check for SSH logins to ESXi hosts as vpxuser from gateway addresses, and for traffic from 130.94.19[.]204 and 130.94.19[.]168. Check Point also published SHA-256 hashes for the webshell, both TSGA builds, gogo, destroy_v6, the wiper note and the related PhiliKit samples.

About the Author

Ava Okello

Ava Okello covers detection engineering, EDR telemetry, and SOC hunting for SOCtember from London.

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