Skip to content

Response, New York. Noah Park: Check Point Patches Actively Exploited Management Server Path Traversal. Detection, Dallas. Ava Okello: Report Finds Nearly Half of Deployed Detections Need Attention Before SOCs Can Trust Them.

SOCtember

Always First. Fast SOC News.

Screenshot of the Cisco Security Advisory titled Cisco Expressway Series Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, rated Critical, advisory ID cisco-sa-vcs-static-cred-hr7EWZ8t, first published October 21, 2026, CVE-2026-76466, CVSS base score 9.8, no workarounds available.
Image: Cisco (fair use). Cisco's advisory for CVE-2026-76466, which as of Thursday still reports no known malicious use.

Detection

Attackers Took Root on Clustered Cisco Expressway Gateways Soon After a Public Exploit Appeared, Then Pivoted to Internal Nodes, F6 Says, and One Erlang Log Line Gives It Away

The Russian security firm says intruders used CVE-2026-76466 to seize two internet-facing Expressway devices, reached two more cluster nodes inside the network, and edited AI-assisted Python tooling mid-attack. Cisco's advisory still says it knows of no malicious use. Defenders can check erlang.log for a single telltale entry.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon5 min read

LONDON - Attackers exploited a critical flaw in Cisco Expressway, the gateway many organizations use to connect remote staff and partners to their video, voice and messaging systems, to gain root access on clustered devices shortly after a proof-of-concept exploit was posted publicly, the Russian cybersecurity company F6 said.

In a release published on Wednesday, F6 said its cybersecurity center had investigated what it described as the first case of exploitation of the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-76466 and rated 9.8 out of 10 for severity. The victim was a company in Russia, which F6 did not name. It did not attribute the attack to a known group.

Cisco disclosed the flaw on Oct. 21. Its advisory, still at version 1.0 on Thursday, says the Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team "is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability."

What the flaw does

According to Cisco, the bug sits in the database service feature of Expressway and lets an unauthenticated, remote attacker with network access to a device run arbitrary operating system commands as root. Cisco attributes it to "the use of persistent cookies," combined with "insufficient validation of client certificates" when TLS Verify Mode is enabled for clustering. An attacker holding the cookies can connect to the database service and invoke remote procedure call commands, the advisory says. Cisco classifies the weakness as CWE-798, the use of hard-coded credentials.

The flaw affects both Expressway Core and Expressway Edge, in virtual and appliance form, but only when the devices are configured in a cluster. Release X15.5.20 fixes it; customers on X14 or earlier must migrate to a fixed release. Cisco lists no workarounds. It credited Stefan Aleksic of Jane Street with reporting the issue.

How the intrusion unfolded

F6 said the attackers first compromised two Expressway devices reachable from the internet, both running X15.5.3, and then used one of them to reach two other cluster nodes on the organization's internal network. That pivot matters for defenders: the cluster relationship that makes the devices vulnerable also connects the internet-facing edge to systems inside the perimeter.

Screenshot of the F6 press release section, in Russian, describing how the attack developed: two internet-facing Cisco Expressway devices compromised, access to two internal cluster nodes, custom Python scripts for scanning, SMB, SQL Server, WinRM and GitLab, and signs of an AI assistant in the code.
Image: F6 (fair use).F6's account of the attack, in Russian, from its Nov. 18 release.

With root access, the intruders prepared tooling for further movement, F6 said. They used custom Python scripts built to scan the network, find accessible SMB shares, interact with SQL Server and Windows Remote Management, and search GitLab repositories, with the aim of extracting credentials and other sensitive information.

F6 said the attackers reworked the scripts while the attack was in progress, and that the source code contained characteristic comments and descriptions of fixes that pointed to the use of an AI assistant.

The log line to hunt for

F6 singled out one artifact. One of the key signs of successful exploitation, the company said, is the appearance of the entry nodeup,'wombat@127.0.0.1' in the Erlang system log, erlang.log, on Expressway devices. The entry shows that a connection was established with an Erlang node whose identifier matches a known exploitation mechanism for CVE-2026-76466, F6 said, and any team that finds it should examine other logs and artifacts to confirm a compromise.

Screenshot of the F6 press release section, in Russian, on how to detect exploitation, naming the nodeup,'wombat@127.0.0.1' entry in erlang.log, followed by recommendations to update Expressway and restrict TCP ports 4371 to 4372 to trusted cluster nodes.
Image: F6 (fair use).F6's detection guidance and recommendations.

The company also published indicators: two IP addresses, 66.179.31[.]32 and 18.130.47[.]116, and Python files written to paths matching /mnt/harddisk/i{0-9}{4}[a-zA-Z]?/*.py on the devices. Teams that collect Expressway logs centrally can search for the Erlang entry and for connections to or from the two addresses; teams that do not can pull erlang.log from each cluster node directly.

What to do now

F6 urged organizations to update Expressway to a fixed version. Where that is not immediately possible, it recommended restricting connections to TCP ports 4371 and 4372 at the firewall so that only the IP addresses of trusted cluster nodes can reach them.

Screenshot of the Fixed Releases table in Cisco's advisory showing X14 and earlier must migrate to a fixed release and X15.5.3 and earlier are fixed in X15.5.20, followed by a section saying Cisco PSIRT is not aware of malicious use.
Image: Cisco (fair use).Cisco's fixed-release table and its exploitation statement, as of Thursday.

For security operations teams, the case argues for treating the Expressway cluster as a single trust zone. If one internet-facing node shows the Erlang entry, the internal nodes it clusters with should be examined as well, along with the SMB, SQL Server, WinRM and GitLab systems that the attackers' scripts were built to reach, and any credentials stored on or reachable from those systems should be considered for rotation.

About the Author

Ava Okello

Ava Okello covers detection engineering, EDR telemetry, and SOC hunting for SOCtember from London.

Related stories

Detection desk