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Microsoft Threat Intelligence diagram titled Shared entry point, two AD CS abuse paths, showing Teams help desk impersonation, an unauthorized remote session, runtime staging and AD CS discovery, then branching into Case 1, ESC1 template abuse, and Case 2, PetitPotam and ESC8, with different containment outcomes.
Image: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (fair use). Figure 1 from Microsoft's Oct. 30, 2026, report.

Detection

Microsoft Says Fake Help Desk Calls in Teams Led to Two AD CS Takeovers, and a Privileged Account Left Out of Automated Containment Was Later Used to Steal Data

In one intrusion the attacker abused an ESC1-vulnerable certificate template to obtain certificates for privileged accounts and ran DCSync; in the other, PetitPotam and an ESC8 relay produced a certificate for a domain controller. Microsoft published hunting queries, the Defender alerts for each stage and AD CS hardening steps.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon6 min read

LONDON - Attackers who posed as IT support in Microsoft Teams talked employees into opening Quick Assist sessions, then used weaknesses in Active Directory Certificate Services to turn those desktops into certificate-backed access to privileged accounts and, in one case, a domain controller's identity, Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported on Friday.

The report, by Microsoft Security Research with Sagar Patil, Jesse Birch and Tal Tzhori, describes two human-operated intrusions that began the same way and split at the certificate layer. In the first, the attacker abused a certificate template vulnerable to the technique known as ESC1 and ran DCSync against a domain controller. In the second, the attacker used PetitPotam to force a domain controller to authenticate, relayed that NTLM authentication to AD CS Web Enrollment, a technique known as ESC8, and obtained a certificate for the domain controller's own account.

Microsoft said the activity did not exploit a vulnerability in Teams and is not attributed to a specific threat actor. It relied on social engineering and on "insecure or overly permissive AD CS configurations."

The lesson for responders, in Microsoft's telling, is that a password reset is not the end of it. "Resetting the user's password or reimaging the first workstation does not revoke an issued certificate or invalidate Kerberos tickets that have already been issued," the researchers wrote.

The same opening, then a runtime from a KB folder

Both intrusions started with Teams messages and calls that impersonated support staff, often from organization-themed onmicrosoft.com tenants with support-style display names. Once the user handed over a Quick Assist connection code, the attacker dropped an archive into the Downloads folder, created a KB-prefixed staging directory under the user's profile, extracted the archive there and launched the payload with a portable Python, JavaScript or Java runtime. In one variant, a renamed executable kept version metadata identifying it as the Bun runtime.

The staged code queried Windows version information, network configuration and running processes, connected to domain infrastructure over LDAPS and SMB, and began assessing AD CS. Microsoft cautioned that file names are weak indicators. "The actionable pattern is a portable runtime launched from a newly created, user-writable staging directory after an unauthorized remote session," the report said.

Case 1: ESC1 and the account left out of containment

Microsoft Threat Intelligence diagram titled Case 1: Help desk impersonation led to ESC1 certificate abuse, tracing two Teams phishing waves, AD CS enumeration, ESC1 certificate abuse and DCSync, with Defender attack disruption restricting most identities while one excluded privileged account remained usable and later supported data exfiltration.
Image: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (fair use).Figure 6, the ESC1 case.

The first Teams wave targeted three user accounts and compromised one workstation. The attacker found an ESC1-vulnerable template, which lets a requester supply identity information in the certificate request, and obtained certificates for three highly privileged accounts. Microsoft Defender attack disruption restricted the first user and those three identities. One privileged account, however, was excluded from automated response.

About 90 minutes later, a larger wave targeted 16 users and compromised a second workstation. The attacker again abused the template, this time obtaining certificates for eight more privileged accounts. Disruption blocked more than 1,000 subsequent SMB file-access attempts along with other logon attempts. But within seconds of obtaining one privileged certificate, the attacker authenticated to a domain controller and started DCSync while containment was still taking effect.

The excluded account stayed usable. The attacker used it to reach a file server and launched a renamed copy of Rclone, saved as SearchApp.exe, that copied a file share to an external SFTP destination with 20 concurrent transfers, selecting files up to three years old. "Partial identity containment can reduce attack activity while still leaving a viable privileged route," Microsoft wrote.

Case 2: PetitPotam, ESC8 and a domain controller certificate

Microsoft Threat Intelligence diagram titled Case 2: Help desk impersonation led to PetitPotam and ESC8, showing Teams phishing and Quick Assist, archive extraction and runtime launch, PetitPotam coercion, ESC8 relay to AD CS Web Enrollment, certificate-based Kerberos authentication, Defender alerts, customer response and the observed outcome.
Image: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (fair use).Figure 8, the ESC8 case.

In the second environment, the ESC1 path was not available. The attacker sent requests over the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol to make the domain controller authenticate to an attacker-controlled system with its machine account, then relayed that NTLM authentication to AD CS Web Enrollment and requested a certificate using the Domain Controller template. The attacker used that certificate for Kerberos PKINIT and obtained a ticket-granting ticket for the domain controller.

Microsoft called out the strongest pivot: the AD CS server authenticated the domain controller's machine account even though the connection came from another device. Defender raised ESC8-related alerts, the customer isolated the workstation tied to the enrollment and Kerberos activity, and no further progression was observed.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence sanitized transcription titled AD CS Web Enrollment, sanitized paths, listing the certsrv, certfnsh.asp and certnew.cer request paths on a CA host.
Image: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (fair use).Figure 9, sanitized AD CS Web Enrollment paths used during the ESC8 certificate issuance.

What to hunt and what to fix

Microsoft published four advanced hunting queries. One looks in CloudAppEvents for external Teams chats and the TeamsImpersonationDetected and SecurityRiskInCallDetected actions. Two look in DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceNetworkEvents for Bun or Java running .js or .java files from AppData\Roaming\KB folders, including network connections on ports 80, 445, 636 and 88. A fourth joins AlertInfo and AlertEvidence for alerts mentioning NTLM relay, Certificate Services, PKINIT or Kerberos ticket requests. The report lists the Defender alerts that map to each stage, from "Possible Teams phishing affecting more than two users" to "Suspicious certificate usage over Kerberos protocol (PKINIT)," and three SHA-256 hashes for the initial access scripts.

Its hardening and response guidance includes:

  • Follow KB5005413 on mitigating NTLM relay against AD CS. Inventory Web Enrollment and Certificate Enrollment Web Service endpoints, remove those not needed, require HTTPS and enforce Extended Protection for Authentication.
  • Review authentication-capable templates for requester-supplied subject information, broad enrollment rights and weak issuance requirements, and use Defender for Identity's AD CS posture assessments to find ESC1 and ESC8 exposure.
  • Enable Certification Services auditing for success and failure, and preserve CA security events, CA database records and Web Enrollment logs.
  • If an unauthorized certificate was issued, revoke it by serial number and thumbprint, then review Kerberos tickets separately. "Revoking a certificate does not retroactively invalidate TGTs or service tickets that were already issued," the report said.
  • Treat containment exclusions as incident decisions, and assign a manual action for any account or device that cannot be contained automatically.

About the Author

Ava Okello

Ava Okello covers detection engineering, EDR telemetry, and SOC hunting for SOCtember from London.

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