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Forescout diagram of the ROMULUS delivery platform showing servers, PowerShell stage routes and MSI routes, including the Stardock DeElevation payload and a commodity loader chain.
Diagram: Forescout Research - Vedere Labs, ROMULUS delivery platform servers and payload routes, Oct 15, 2026 (fair use).

Detection

Siemens Says ClickFix Attackers Side-Loaded Malware Through a Signed Copy of Its Software Center, Using a ROMULUS Delivery Platform Forescout and Huntress Had Seen Abusing Signed Canon and Stardock Apps

Siemens patched CVE-2026-110936 and published indicators after attackers bundled a genuine, signed SiemensSoftwareCenter.exe with their own DLLs; Forescout found ROMULUS running on the server that distributed the package, and Huntress tied a related campaign using signed Canon and Stardock carriers to at least 40 incidents that began with Custom GPT and Google Sites lures.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon5 min read

LONDON - Siemens said on Oct. 19 that attackers have exploited a DLL side-loading flaw in Siemens Software Center by carrying their own genuine, digitally signed copy of the program onto victims' computers and placing malicious DLLs beside it. The company tied the activity to ROMULUS, a ClickFix delivery platform that Forescout documented four days earlier. One ROMULUS server had already surfaced in a Huntress investigation of a campaign behind at least 40 incidents that abused signed Canon and Stardock applications.

The flaw, CVE-2026-110936, is an uncontrolled search path weakness. Siemens' advisory SSA-580366, first published Oct. 15, scores it 8.4 under CVSS v4.0 and says it affects all versions before 4.0.9.8. Siemens added the fixed version on Oct. 17 and linked the advisory to a ProductCERT post on active exploitation on Oct. 19. The advisory credits Jose Oregon of Huntress Labs with reporting the issue.

A trusted file as the carrier

The Siemens post is unusually direct about why the program was chosen. "They chose this program as a carrier because it is signed and trusted, and because version 3.5.8.7, the latest version at the time, loaded helper files from its own folder without checking them," the company wrote. Siemens said the program itself was not modified, that the malicious code sits in the DLLs the attackers supplied, and that "No Siemens system, product or update channel was breached to our knowledge."

According to Siemens, the bundle was an installer named AllMyBasic.msi carrying a malicious archive.dll. It listed 96.62.218[.]59 and one domain as active payload hosting and command-and-control infrastructure, and 2.27.248[.]127 as an inactive distribution channel for the MSI.

That last address is the bridge between the Siemens case and earlier research. Forescout's Vedere Labs, publishing on Oct. 15, listed 2.27.248[.]127 among six IP addresses exposing the same dark-themed ROMULUS login page.

Forescout screenshot of the ROMULUS panel login page with a shield icon, username and password fields and a Log in button.
Screenshot: Forescout Research - Vedere Labs, ROMULUS panel login page, Oct 15, 2026 (fair use).The same login page appeared on six servers, including the one Siemens names as its distribution channel.

What ROMULUS does

Forescout described ROMULUS as a reusable delivery backend rather than a single malware server. Each instance exposes a /s/ route that serves an obfuscated PowerShell staging script and an /app/ route that serves a trojanized MSI, both keyed by 12-character hexadecimal tokens. One server also exposed a statistics page counting "unique installs" and "all runs." On one route the stager pulled a Stardock-signed side-loading package; on another it fetched password-protected 7z archives that unpacked to an executable of 882,716,672 bytes that ultimately ran a commodity malware loader. Forescout said the padding lets attackers ship an archive under 1 MB that expands into a file large enough to exceed upload, sandbox and static-analysis limits.

Forescout said it could not identify the operator. "ROMULUS may be a privately operated panel, a commercial cybercriminal delivery service, an affiliate framework, or software that has been copied between operators," the researchers wrote.

The Huntress thread

Huntress reported the same tradecraft on Sept. 28. In some of the incidents it investigated, victims who searched for ChatGPT were sent through a sponsored result to an attacker-built Custom GPT titled "Plus 5.6," which pointed them to a Google Sites page posing as a CAPTCHA check. Huntress said its SOC responded to at least 40 incidents tied to that Google Sites domain and confirmed that two came through a Custom GPT. An Oct. 14 update added a new lure domain, gptverification[.]com.

Huntress screenshot of an attacker-built Custom GPT titled Plus 5.6 showing a Service Availability Notice that points users to a Google Sites backup domain.
Screenshot: Huntress, attacker-created Custom GPT lure directing victims to a Google Sites ClickFix page, Sept. 28, 2026 (fair use).Huntress confirmed two infections that began with a Custom GPT.

The pasted command wrote its server as the decimal number 1614733393, which Windows resolves to 96.62.224[.]81, so filters looking for a dotted IP never saw one. Huntress said the dropped script was 27,581 characters long and was almost entirely an array of 3,036 negative integers. The MSI installed a Canon-signed COTFileReadApp.exe under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs, side-loaded a patched Canon DLL, and set an HKCU Run value and a scheduled task both named Canon Configuration Reader. A persistence script re-created the Run value every 150 seconds and the task every 875 seconds. A second wave swapped in Stardock's DeElevate64.exe and delivered, in Huntress' words, the same RAT "down to the last byte."

Forescout's diagram places 96.62.224[.]81 among the ROMULUS servers. Siemens Software Center does not appear in either the Huntress or Forescout report; Siemens made the ROMULUS attribution.

Forescout flowchart of the loader route from a ROMULUS PowerShell stage through nested 7z archives and an inflated executable to RC4 and Base64 command-and-control traffic.
Diagram: Forescout Research - Vedere Labs, ROMULUS Route B execution chain and loader C2 interaction, Oct 15, 2026 (fair use).The second route hides its payload in an inflated executable and talks to C2 with RC4 and Base64 framing.

Why hash-based detection falls short

The carrier binaries in all three waves are legitimate and validly signed, and Siemens says outright that hash blocking is the wrong tool. Its guidance reads: "Detect on folder and behaviour, not on the Siemens file fingerprint: the file itself is genuine." Updating Siemens Software Center fixes installed copies, which update on next launch, but the attackers in this campaign brought their own older signed copy, so patching a legitimate install does not by itself stop a bundled copy from loading attacker DLLs. Huntress drew the same conclusion from the Canon and Stardock waves and found a third installer, UltraFreeISOCreateWizardSolution.msi, on the same delivery server. "Detections tied to Canon or Stardock names will miss the next swap," the company wrote.

What defenders should do

  • Hunt for SiemensSoftwareCenter.exe running from AppData\Local\Programs and started by msiexec, and for a folder named SM Software Provisioning Service there, as Siemens advises. Siemens also lists activate.bak or statinfosta.DB next to the executable and an FTSuite folder containing ftc.uml under AppData\Local.
  • Generalize the pattern, as Huntress recommends: PowerShell launching msiexec on a GUID-named MSI in %TEMP%, a signed vendor app launched by msiexec from a fake product folder under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs, and a Run value and scheduled task that share one name and return when deleted.
  • Search command lines and PowerShell script block logs (event 4104) for URLs that use an 8-to-10-digit decimal host, and alert on PowerShell run with -NoProfile, -ep bypass or -w hidden alongside a URL, per Forescout.
  • Flag very large executables written to user-writable paths, and PowerShell spawning 7zr.exe with a password switch, two checks Forescout ties to the loader route.
  • Block 96.62.218[.]59 and the Siemens-listed domain, search logs for 2.27.248[.]127, and review the ROMULUS server list Forescout published.
  • On a hit, follow Siemens' order: isolate the machine, stop the process first, then remove the start-up entry and scheduled task, and reset passwords. Huntress warns the persistence script restores deleted entries while the implant runs.
  • Update any legitimate Siemens Software Center installs to 4.0.9.8 or later, and download Siemens software only from official sources.

Sources:


Ava Okello covers detection engineering and SOC operations for SOCtember from London.

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