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SOCRadar research splash graphic introducing ICMacOS as a macOS infostealer that evolved into a persistent RAT, with a laptop and attack-flow diagram.
Screenshot: SOCRadar Threat Research Unit, article splash graphic ICMacOS: From an Infostealer to a Persistent RAT, from Inside ICMacOS: From an Infostealer to a Persistent RAT, Oct 12, 2026 (fair use).

Detection

SOCRadar Says ICMacOS Evolved From a macOS Infostealer to a Persistent RAT With ClickFix Lures and WebSocket C2

SOCRadar Threat Research Unit says the GlowComa MaaS offering pairs Icarus ClickFix terminal paste delivery with fake System Preferences password dialogs, then Version 2 adds a com.apple.systemupdater LaunchAgent and a Gorilla WebSocket shell to escapeai[.]live.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon6 min read

LONDON - SOCRadar Threat Research Unit said on Oct. 12, 2026 that ICMacOS, also marketed as Icarus macOS, has moved from a one-shot credential stealer into a persistent remote-access implant for Apple Macs, sold as malware-as-a-service by a Russian-speaking operator tracked as GlowComa. The report says the family has been promoted on XSS, Exploit.in, and Rehub since early September 2026 under the MADHASH crypto-draining banner, bundled with an Icarus ClickFix social-engineering panel and a multi-chain crypto clipper. Version 1 focuses on browsers, Keychain, wallets, messaging apps, and developer secrets. Version 2 keeps that harvesting and adds LaunchAgent persistence plus a live Gorilla WebSocket command shell. For SOC and EDR teams that already hunt ClickFix paste lures on Windows, the write-up is a concrete macOS companion: fake System Preferences dialogs, Apple-like LaunchAgent labels, and outbound traffic to escapeai[.]live.

Delivery starts with ClickFix-style pages that push victims to paste a terminal command. SOCRadar says a Bash first stage downloads a build-specific dropper from escapeai[.]live, saves it under /tmp, and runs it with operator build and owner parameters used for campaign tracking. The dropper logs to a hidden /tmp/.update-helper.log file, strips Terminal window titles through com.apple.Terminal preferences, and uses osascript to present a spoofed System Preferences password prompt. Captured passwords are checked with security unlock-keychain against the login Keychain, with up to five attempts. After a successful unlock, the dropper reads uname -m, fetches the matching arm64 or amd64 Mach-O archive from escapeai[.]live/ICMacOs, launches it in the background with the stolen password, build name, and owner ID, then kills Terminal and can show a remote-configured fake error dialog.

macOS dialog spoofed as System Preferences that asks for a password while a run.sh script sits on the desktop.
Screenshot: SOCRadar Threat Research Unit, ICMacOS Dropper Default Fake System Preferences Dialog, Oct 12, 2026 (fair use).The dropper presents a spoofed System Preferences password prompt.
Bash snippet that curls icmacos_run_v2.command from escapeai.live, marks it executable, and runs it with build and owner parameters.
Screenshot: SOCRadar Threat Research Unit, ICMacOS First Dropper Script, Oct 12, 2026 (fair use).The first stage downloads a build-specific command from escapeai.live.

The core payload is a 64-bit Go Mach-O. Version 1, SOCRadar says, geo-fences Commonwealth of Independent States victims through locale checks for ru_RU and an ipinfo.io country lookup, then harvests host metadata, Chromium/Gecko/Safari credentials and cookies, data from 29 targeted browser extensions for crypto wallets and password managers, desktop crypto wallets, Telegram tdata and WhatsApp databases, Discord tokens, iMessage history, SSH and cloud developer files including AWS, Kubernetes, Docker, and .env paths, Apple Notes, and Termius configs before uploading a hidden ZIP to escapeai[.]live/upload. Version 2 adds process de-confliction with pgrep, wheel/root privilege checks, and a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.systemupdater.plist that uses KeepAlive and a 3600-second StartInterval, loaded immediately with launchctl bootstrap. The same build opens wss://escapeai[.]live/ws with hostname and username query parameters, executes inbound text commands through /bin/sh, and returns stdout and stderr in real time. A companion Python payload at escapeai[.]live/payload.py extends collection to VPN profiles, Slack, Signal, Zoom, and document grabs from Desktop, Documents, and Downloads.

SOCRadar threat-hunting view of GlowComa Telegram channel messages promoting ICMacOS stealer updates.
Screenshot: SOCRadar Threat Research Unit, ICMacOS Telegram Messages on SOCRadar Threat Hunting Module, Oct 12, 2026 (fair use).GlowComa Telegram posts advertise ICMacOS updates and collection modules.

GlowComa's Telegram channel and forum posts advertise weekly, biweekly, and monthly subscriptions, with a discounted monthly tier for existing Icarus ClickFix panel customers, plus a Go/MySQL web panel for build analytics, log tracking, custom VPS integration, and Telegram alerts. SOCRadar notes GlowComa also faces Exploit.in arbitration disputes over conversion rates and detection, and that marketing excludes Russia and other CIS countries. Subscriptions and underground chatter do not by themselves prove enterprise prevalence, but the behavioral surface is huntable: Terminal preference tampering, osascript password dialogs, security unlock-keychain or dump-keychain activity, Mach-O drops under /tmp/.update-tmp, LaunchAgents named like com.apple.systemupdater, hidden /tmp logs and ZIP archives, and HTTPS or WebSocket traffic to escapeai[.]live or mikoblico[.]xyz. The report's host and network indicator tables give SHA256 hashes for droppers, Mach-O builds, and the Python helper that detection engineers can load into blocklists and hunting queries.

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Ava Okello covers detection engineering and SOC operations for SOCtember from London.

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