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Screenshot of Windows Event Viewer showing a saved System log with 104 events dated July 7, 2026, mostly Eventlog entries with event ID 104 and task category Log clear, and a details pane reading The System log file was cleared.
Image: Arctic Wolf (fair use). Event Viewer showing the 104 events left in the cleared System log, Arctic Wolf's Figure 5.

Response

Clearing a Windows Event Log Leaves Earlier Records Inside the Same File, Arctic Wolf Says, and Its Responders Pulled a Ransomware Encryptor's Password Out of a Cleared System Log

Arctic Wolf incident responders found that a cleared EVTX file keeps older records in the unused space of its first 64 KB chunk until new events overwrite them. Standard parsers do not show those records, and the firm says it found no forensic tool that flags them.

Noah Park, ResponseNew York5 min read

NEW YORK - When ransomware operators clear Windows event logs to cover their tracks, they may be leaving the evidence in place, researchers at the security firm Arctic Wolf reported this week. Its incident responders found that clearing a log does not wipe the underlying EVTX file, and that records from before the clearing can survive inside the very file Windows reports as empty.

In a post published Nov. 19, Arctic Wolf analysts Cole Pixley and Eric Draeger described a ransomware investigation in which the attacker had cleared several logs on a domain controller. The encryptor would not run without a password, and to reverse engineer it the analysts needed the password switch from the command line used to launch it.

Screenshot of the Arctic Wolf blog post titled Windows Event Log Cleared? Think Outside the Box, dated November 19, 2026, with a dek saying new research reveals that cleared Windows Event Logs may still contain recoverable evidence inside EVTX files.
Image: Arctic Wolf (fair use).Arctic Wolf's research post on cleared event logs.

Three hours that were not there

The domain controller's System.EVTX showed a final log clearing at 16:01 Pacific time and 104 events between then and collection at 17:26, a count the analysts said they confirmed with Windows Event Viewer, Eric Zimmerman's EvtxECmd and Magnet AXIOM. Other artifacts showed the encryptor had run around 12:53, roughly three hours earlier, but nothing from that time appeared in the parsed log.

A keyword search of the physical disk image for the password switch returned the encryptor's full command line, run from a binary renamed svc-host.exe. The location surprised the team. Rather than sitting in unallocated space, where remnants of deleted logs would normally be expected, the string was inside the allocated System.EVTX file, carrying the 12:53 timestamp. Another supposedly cleared record in the same file showed the attacker's use of netscan.exe and a leaked threat actor hostname.

Hex view of an EVTX file from Arctic Wolf's analysis with a highlighted event record whose identifier is 2,635,218, part of the bytes redacted, and decoded text on the right including a path ending in netscan.exe.
Image: Arctic Wolf (fair use).A pre-clearing record showing netscan activity, still inside the cleared EVTX file, Arctic Wolf's Figure 9.

Why the records survive

Arctic Wolf's explanation rests on how the format works. An EVTX file is at least 68 KB, a 4 KB file header plus at least one 64 KB chunk of event records. When a log is cleared, the firm wrote, Windows truncates everything after the first 64 KB chunk and resets the first and last record numbers in the header, but does not empty the rest of that first chunk. "In effect, clearing the log merely hides its remaining contents," the analysts wrote, and until new events fill the 64 KB, data from the previous log remains.

Parsers that trust the header never reach those bytes. "In our testing, we didn't identify any forensic tool that flags records left in EVTX slack space after a log is cleared," the firm wrote. It said one tool it reviewed can parse records sequentially without relying on the header and may surface them, but does not indicate whether a record predates a clearing event, a distinction it called important in cases involving anti-forensics. Recovery is not a simple carve, either: EVTX uses substitution templates for repeated values such as hostnames and event descriptions, so some details are missing from leftover records, though basic information survives verbatim and many templates can be rebuilt because Microsoft standardizes them.

The team tested the idea on a second incident, a cleared Windows PowerShell log. Event Viewer showed one record. The file held 44, and every one was the same clearing command: powershell.exe -ep bypass -Command Get-WinEvent -ListLog * | where { $_.RecordCount } | ForEach-Object -Process{[System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader.EventLogSession]::GlobalSession.ClearLog($_.LogName) }. The analysts said the attacker had cleared the log several times, and that they could not determine whether the slack space had been filled on purpose.

Screenshot of Windows Event Viewer showing a cleared Windows PowerShell log with one event dated March 6, 2026, whose details show a host application command line running Get-WinEvent -ListLog and ClearLog for every log.
Image: Arctic Wolf (fair use).The single visible entry in a cleared Windows PowerShell log, Arctic Wolf's Figure 11.

What responders can change

Arctic Wolf noted that clearing logs, a step built into many ransomware encryptors, often trips endpoint and intrusion detection alerts and is frequently the action that exposes an attack in progress. Its research suggests the clearing alert is also a prompt to collect the log files themselves quickly and intact, before new events fill the first chunk, and to search the raw files and the disk image rather than relying only on parsed output.

The firm said it built a proof-of-concept Python script to carve and rebuild old records from an allocated EVTX file, and it called on forensic tool makers to at least alert on EVTX files that may contain old data, recover those records and label them as partial in normal output. Its references include the 2007 research paper by Andreas Schuster that first described the Vista event log format, the libevtx chunk header documentation and X-Ways templates for reading chunk headers by hand.

About the Author

Noah Park

Noah Park covers incident response, identity compromise, and blue-team operations for SOCtember from New York.

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