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Google Cloud Threat Intelligence banner: horizontal orange and red gradient bars above the words Threat Intelligence and the Google Cloud logo.
Image: Google Cloud (fair use). Threat Intelligence banner from the GTIG post "COLD RELIC: A Case Study in Impersonation and Compromise," published Nov. 17, 2026.

Response

Google Says Russia's COLD RELIC Used a Staff Directory Stolen From One US Organization to Pose as Its Employee and Break Into Another, Then Held On With Rogue Passkeys and MFA Devices

Mandiant investigated both intrusions. In the first, the FSB-linked group wore down a Super Admin with MFA push prompts, deleted Alert Center notices and ordered a tenant-wide Customer Takeout. Google says password resets alone did not evict it, and it published a detection table tied to Google Workspace log events.

Noah Park, ResponseNew York6 min read

NEW YORK - A Russian espionage group that broke into one US organization in late 2025 used that victim's staff directory and identities this year to pose as one of its employees and breach a second US organization, Google Threat Intelligence Group said on Tuesday, in a case study drawn from Mandiant investigations of both intrusions.

Google tracks the group as COLD RELIC, its new name for the actor it previously called COLDRIVER and UNC4057. Microsoft calls it Star Blizzard, and others call it Callisto and Gossamer Bear. The US Department of Justice has assessed that it operates within Russia's Federal Security Service. Google said the group has compromised government officials, defense contractors and nongovernmental organizations in Europe and North America while drawing little public reporting, and that it saw new COLD RELIC phishing operations as recently as this month.

A pretext built from the last victim

Most COLD RELIC phishing links, Google said, start at a compromised website that fingerprints the visitor before redirecting to the real phishing domain. The link often ends in a parameter the operators set themselves, naming a previous victim or the lure. In the second intrusion, the operators opened a conversation on an encrypted messaging app while posing as an employee of the first victim organization. Separately, Google matched a COLD RELIC redirector URL from that intrusion, submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026, whose query parameter referenced the first victim organization.

Screenshot of the Google Threat Intelligence Group post showing two sample COLD RELIC phishing URLs on a compromised site, each ending in a file or ref parameter.
Image: Google Threat Intelligence Group (fair use).Figure 1 from the GTIG post, sample URLs that carry a previous victim's name or a lure topic, captured Nov. 18, 2026.

The victim at the second organization used Microsoft Entra ID as the single sign-on provider for Google Workspace. During the chat, the operators sent links that harvested Entra ID credentials and authentication tokens and then redirected the target to document lures matching the conversation. After signing in, they registered a new MFA device in the SSO service and used it to keep access, then bulk-downloaded files from the user's cloud drive. Google said the operators later changed the messaging profile's name to a different person, likely to reuse the account against other organizations in the same professional circles.

Inside the first tenant

The 2025 intrusion began with a Super Admin's stolen password, a residential proxy in the US close to the victim, and MFA push notifications sent until one was accepted. The operators then registered a device model the tenant had never seen and kept access with passkeys, MFA backup codes and rogue MFA devices.

Screenshot of the Case Study 1 section of the GTIG post describing the Super Admin compromise, MFA fatigue, mass file sharing, Alert Center deletions and Customer Takeout.
Image: Google Threat Intelligence Group (fair use).Screenshot of the Case Study 1 section of the GTIG post, captured Nov. 18, 2026.

With Super Admin rights, the group downloaded the contents of the organization's entire cloud storage drive, both by sharing files in bulk to an email account it controlled and by downloading them directly. It queried the Admin security investigation and email audit logs to see what defenders could see, viewed, changed and deleted Alert Center notifications to erase evidence of the initial break-in, exported the full employee list and started a domain-wide export through Google Workspace Customer Takeout. Google noted that Customer Takeout is an administrative, tenant-wide tool and that each request is logged as CUSTOMER_TAKEOUT_CREATED in the Admin audit log.

The operators stayed for months. They synced mailboxes to outside email clients through OAuth, signed back in with passkeys they had enrolled that survived password and session resets, and went after drive documents tied to credentials, email archives and personnel. Google said the group generally also hunts for rosters, contact lists, resumes and event schedules that can feed the next pretext. Once removed from the tenant, they used accounts impersonating the victim's employees to phish both its own staff and contacts in the same field.

Why the first cleanup failed

In at least one case, Google said, a victim found the intrusion and reset passwords for the affected accounts but did not revoke existing sessions, so COLD RELIC kept its access through hijacked sessions. The company's guidance for account compromise is to revoke every browser session, refresh token and third-party OAuth grant in both Google Workspace and Entra ID, and to remove unknown passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices, not just to change the password.

Screenshot of the GTIG detection table mapping COLD RELIC activity to MITRE ATT&CK techniques and Google Workspace log events, starting with MFA fatigue, OAuth mail sync and Customer Takeout.
Image: Google Threat Intelligence Group (fair use).The first rows of the GTIG detection table, captured Nov. 18, 2026.

The detection table gives SOC teams specific events to alert on: repeated MFA challenges followed by a success from the same IP address; OAuth Authorize events granting the full mail.google.com scope to clients such as Thunderbird or Proton; any Customer Takeout Created event; Drive download and external-sharing spikes, especially to free email providers; Passkey enrolled and Device Registered events after an MFA fatigue pattern; logins using a backup code from a non-corporate network; batch deletions in Alert Center; User List Download and Investigation Query events in the Admin log; and Drive searches for terms such as .pst, .bak, password and cred. Google SecOps carries matching rules in its Mandiant Frontline Threats pack, including one for device or passkey enrollment following MFA fatigue.

Screenshot of the GTIG remediation guidance on session and OAuth revocation in business email compromise playbooks and on blocking residential proxy logons.
Image: Google Threat Intelligence Group (fair use).Part of the GTIG remediation and hardening guidance, captured Nov. 18, 2026.

Because COLD RELIC picks proxies that geolocate near its victims, impossible-travel alerts are unlikely to fire. Google recommends enriching sign-in logs with residential proxy and VPN reputation data, alerting when a privileged account suddenly shifts to a residential network, and restricting administrative access from consumer ISPs and known residential proxy ranges, naming AS5650 and AS20115 as examples. It also recommends FIDO2 security keys in place of push, SMS and voice MFA, out-of-band approval before a new authenticator is added, regular review of third-party OAuth grants, and data loss prevention rules that flag documents holding passwords or rosters. Some intrusions grew worse, it said, because users had stored credentials in cloud drives.

About the Author

Noah Park

Noah Park covers incident response, identity compromise, and blue-team operations for SOCtember from New York.

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