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Huntress screenshot of Power BI Reference Verification Form with Download Reference button.
Figure: Huntress, Figure 2, Power BI Download Reference lure on legitimate app.powerbi.com, Oct 7, 2026 (fair use).

Response

Huntress Tracks Phishing Campaign Abusing Microsoft Power BI to Deploy Rogue ScreenConnect RMMs

Huntress details September phishing that hosted blurred Download Reference lures on legitimate Power BI domains, then delayed ScreenConnect installer downloads that staged two rogue RMM clients, HideUL, and a two-minute repair task.

Noah Park, ResponseNew York5 min read

NEW YORK - Huntress traced a September phishing campaign that turned legitimate Microsoft Power BI pages into the first hop toward rogue ScreenConnect remote monitoring and management clients. In an Oct. 7 report, Sarah Reddish shows how emails steered victims to a public Power BI view, a blurred "Reference Verification Form," and a Download Reference control that opened attacker-controlled sites. Those sites fingerprinted visitors, reported telemetry to a Telegram bot, and after a short delay triggered ScreenConnect installer downloads.

Huntress infographic of phishing email, Power BI page, fake download, rogue installer, rogue ScreenConnect.
Figure: Huntress, Figure 1, outline of the phishing campaign from email through rogue ScreenConnect, Oct 7, 2026 (fair use).The chain runs from a phishing email to a second rogue ScreenConnect client.

Starting Sept. 10, Huntress saw the same delivery vector, ScreenConnect clients, and network indicators hit a handful of endpoints. A retroactive hunt tied one of those ScreenConnect client and configuration pairs to 22 other endpoints across separate incidents. The Power BI lure used a real app.powerbi.com view URL, which can pass mail filters that trust Microsoft domains. Clicking Download Reference opened tabs such as dailylifeproject[.]site/S/, burnsworth[.]site, essaywritingservice[.]site, and openpediatrics[.]site. Landing pages checked operating system, browser, automation signals, and related attributes, then reused a hardcoded Telegram Bot API credential and chat identifier to report IP, geolocation, browser, OS, and download activity. Visitors who failed checks were redirected away from the payload path.

Huntress screenshot of sendToTelegram JavaScript posting to Telegram Bot API.
Figure: Huntress, Figure 3, main.js Telegram bot reuse for victim telemetry, Oct 7, 2026 (fair use).The landing page reports visitor telemetry through a Telegram bot.

When the delayed download ran, ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe came from hamham27[.]screenconnect[.]com with guest-access tokens such as ILEAYEASAN, PERFECTO, and PAPASUPE. In every case Huntress describes, the first rogue client (2b302081e9e777d0, SHA256 5956f9afb3ba610c38b2cfda88dd15be98783963769a12020c93ce05e749b3c3) connected to instance-g01s1n-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com, then established a second rogue client (43773b3da4ccb17b, SHA256 f048400c23add8c75abe189393d33c873c02c74eeaf43d47b950c8d643763b35) tied to onthegotree[.]site. In one incident the first client ran LyN03DvVjUKPrun.cmd, which launched SCAutoFix.ps1 from temp, pulled another installer from onthegotree[.]site, and uninstalled the first client in what Huntress assessed as evasion. After the RMMs landed, HideUL_x64.exe ran as defense evasion tooling, and a scheduled task SCAutoRepairEvery2Min re-ran SCAutoFix.ps1 every two minutes until the Huntress SOC shut the attack down.

Huntress alert showing ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe under SYSTEM with onthegotree.site host parameter.
Figure: Huntress, Figure 6, signal for second rogue ScreenConnect client 43773b3da4ccb17b to onthegotree.site, Oct 7, 2026 (fair use).The second client service ran as SYSTEM against onthegotree.site.

For SOC and IR teams, the case is a reminder that trusted cloud domains are not a free pass. Review phishing controls and user reporting for Power BI and similar SaaS links that lead to downloads. Hunt for unexpected ScreenConnect ClientService installs, connections to unapproved ScreenConnect instances or relays, multiple RMM clients on one host, HideUL_x64.exe, and SCAutoRepairEvery2Min or SCAutoFix.ps1. Restrict remote management software to approved instances and investigate endpoints that show dual ScreenConnect footprints.

Sources:


Noah Park covers incident response and blue-team operations for SOCtember from New York.

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