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Wiz Research artwork for the NGINX HTTP/2 vulnerabilities: the NGINX logo on a blue server rack, a terminal window and the labels CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007.
Image: Wiz Research (fair use). Header art from the Wiz analysis of CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007, published Nov. 18, 2026.

Response

Five Research Teams Found the Same Two NGINX HTTP/2 Flaws That Let an Unauthenticated Attacker Run Code, and F5 Has Shipped Fixes; Until Servers Are Patched, Turning Off HTTP/2 Is the Stopgap

F5 released NGINX 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 on Wednesday to fix a use-after-free and a flow-control underflow that Wiz and Rapid7 each turned into working exploits in the lab. Rapid7's proof of concept needed about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic, which gives defenders something to watch for while they patch.

Noah Park, ResponseNew York6 min read

NEW YORK - F5 released security updates for NGINX on Wednesday that fix two flaws in the web server's HTTP/2 code which, researchers say, let an attacker with no credentials execute code on the server. Five teams found the bugs independently: Wiz Research, Ikotas Labs, Metnir, Rapid7 and Xint. Wiz and Rapid7 both said they built working exploits in their labs.

The flaws are tracked as CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007, and Wiz rated both 9.2 on the CVSS 4.0 scale. They sit in NGINX itself, not in the applications behind it, so a site whose own code is sound can still be exposed. Both require HTTP/2 to be enabled. The fixed open source releases are 1.30.7 stable and 1.31.9 mainline. Neither Wiz nor Rapid7 reported exploitation in the wild, and Wiz said it would not release its exploits for now.

NGINX is the front door for a large share of the web, often terminating HTTPS and routing traffic for several applications at once. Wiz put its footprint at more than 225 million websites, which is why a bug in the server's core reaches well past any single service.

Wiz Research diagram showing an attacker sending HTTP/2 requests to a compromised NGINX server that fronts a login service, a customer portal and a transaction API, with stolen data, altered websites and disrupted service listed as consequences.
Image: Wiz Research (fair use).Diagram from the Wiz analysis showing why one compromised NGINX server can put several applications at risk.

Two different bugs in the same protocol code

CVE-2026-123633 is a use-after-free that Wiz traced to how NGINX keeps a list of idle connections it can close when it needs room. An HTTP/2 connection can be marked as reusable while a request's headers are still arriving, and it is not taken off that list once the request begins. If connection slots run low while NGINX opens a connection to a backend server, it can close the very connection whose request it is still processing and then keep using the freed memory. Wiz said that path applies to reverse proxy deployments and has existed for nearly six years; the nginx.org advisory lists versions 1.19.7 through 1.31.8 as vulnerable.

CVE-2026-123007 is older. It dates to NGINX 1.9.5, released in 2015. When a stream is canceled while its response data is still queued, NGINX returns the unused flow-control credit to the connection without checking the protocol's maximum window. An unsigned subtraction in the next bounds check then wraps around, the window counter grows without limit, and a later response is copied with an invalid length. Wiz said it demonstrated code execution with an ASLR bypass on official 1.31.7 and 1.31.8 builds serving ordinary static files over TLS on 64-bit systems, with no backend application or third-party module involved.

The nginx.org advisory page rates CVE-2026-123007 as major and CVE-2026-123633 as medium, lower than the researchers' scores. The same release fixes several other issues, including a use-after-free in HTTP/3, a use-after-free in the mail proxy module and an infinite loop when reading a request body over TLS 1.3.

What exploitation actually takes

Rapid7 researcher Stephen Fewer, who found CVE-2026-123007, published the most detailed account of the practical limits. His proof of concept achieved code execution against an NGINX 1.31.8 Docker image with HTTP/2 and TLS enabled, running with the permissions of the worker process. It required about 128 GB of HTTP/2 data. The demonstration took two and a half minutes; Rapid7 estimated about two minutes on a 10 Gbit/s link and 17 minutes on a 1 Gbit/s link, and said a connection slower than roughly 300 Mbit/s would hit NGINX's default one-hour connection lifetime before finishing.

Rapid7 proof-of-concept recording: one terminal shows WINDOW_UPDATE replay progress, an ASLR bypass and payload dispatch after 147.48 seconds, while a second terminal shows a shell returned as the nginx user on version 1.31.8.
Image: Rapid7 (fair use).Final frame of the Rapid7 proof-of-concept video for CVE-2026-123007 against NGINX 1.31.8, shown in the original at 8x speed.

Rapid7 added that its exploit depends on a specific glibc memory-copy routine selected on processors with certain AVX-512 features, and that a proxied HTTP/2 connection would likely not pass the attacker's frames through intact. Wiz made a similar point: CDNs and web application firewalls that terminate HTTP/2 may blunt parts of an attack, depending on how they are built. Rapid7 said alternative exploitation strategies may be viable, and Wiz cautioned that attackers do not need to cover every configuration. It noted that in the PHP2Shell episode last month, widespread attacks began against packaged products where many customers run the same build and configuration.

What responders should do now

The priority is inventory: find every NGINX instance with HTTP/2 enabled, starting with those an attacker can reach directly, and upgrade. For NGINX Plus, Wiz lists 37.0.7.1 and 37.2.0.1 as fixing CVE-2026-123633, and 37.0.8.1 and 37.3.0.1 as fixing CVE-2026-123007. Rapid7's remediation table lists no fix for NGINX Plus R34 through R36. Teams should also check appliances, ingress controllers and container images that bundle their own NGINX build.

Wiz table of affected and fixed NGINX Open Source and NGINX Plus releases, followed by guidance to set http2 off, remove the http2 parameter from listen directives, reload NGINX and investigate worker crashes.
Image: Wiz Research (fair use).Mitigation and detection section of the Wiz analysis, captured Nov. 18, 2026.

Where an upgrade has to wait, Wiz's interim step is to turn HTTP/2 off: set http2 off in affected server blocks on NGINX 1.25.1 or later, remove the http2 parameter from listen directives, reload, and confirm the old worker processes have exited. HTTP/2 can be turned back on after the upgrade.

For hunting, Wiz said CVE-2026-123007 requires a large number of WINDOW_UPDATE frames, so detections for long-lived HTTP/2 connections moving unusually large volumes of data may point to an attempt. Rapid7's figure of about 128 GB of HTTP/2 data gives that kind of rule a sense of scale. Wiz also advised investigating unexpected NGINX worker crashes and any commands launched by an NGINX process, while noting that these are general warning signs rather than confirmed indicators of either flaw.

About the Author

Noah Park

Noah Park covers incident response, identity compromise, and blue-team operations for SOCtember from New York.

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