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Rapid7 Emergent Threat Response header art: a white warning triangle at the center of red and purple concentric rings over a faint field of code.
Image: Rapid7 (fair use). Header art from the Rapid7 Emergent Threat Response post on CVE-2026-90436, published Nov. 16, 2026.

Response

Rapid7 Says Attackers Used an Apache Axis Flaw to Break Into Confluence Data Center, Were Querying Its Database Three Minutes Later and Signed In to Microsoft 365 as a Service Account Within 12 Hours

The exploit requests returned HTTP 500 errors while the Confluence process quietly launched Bash and curl. The same Axis 1.x bug, CVE-2026-90436, has been exploited against N-able N-central, and Rapid7 says both products need emergency patching.

Noah Park, ResponseNew York6 min read

NEW YORK - An attacker who exploited a newly disclosed flaw in the Apache Axis library broke into an Atlassian Confluence Data Center server, was querying its database with the application's own credentials about three minutes later and, roughly 12 hours after the first request, signed in to Microsoft 365 as an integration service account, according to Rapid7, whose managed detection and response team worked the intrusion.

The flaw, CVE-2026-90436, is an unsafe reflection bug in Axis 1.x, an old SOAP engine for Java web services. The Apache Software Foundation disclosed it on Nov. 6 and it carries a CVSS score of 9.8. Axis 1.x is end of life, and Apache does not plan a fixed 1.x release. Since the disclosure, Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central have turned out to ship the vulnerable library, though both need a non-default setting to be exposed. Rapid7 detected exploitation against Confluence on Nov. 13, the same day N-able reported in-the-wild exploitation of N-central for a flaw that Rapid7 said "strongly correlates" with CVE-2026-90436. A proof-of-concept exploit aimed at N-central was published on Nov. 12.

Rapid7 blog post page titled Rapid7 Detected Exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Center, N-able N-central also Exploited, showing the overview section.
Image: Rapid7 (fair use).The Rapid7 advisory, first published Nov. 16, 2026, and updated Nov. 17 with the MDR findings.

Errors on the web log, shells on the host

The intrusion surfaced as a burst of alerts on abnormal child processes spawned by a Confluence server. Access logs showed unauthenticated POST requests to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2, each of which returned HTTP 500, an internal server error. Endpoint telemetry told a different story: within seconds of those requests, Confluence's Java process launched Bash and curl under the confluence service account.

That gap matters for triage. A team that reads only web logs could take a run of 500 responses as failed attempts. Rapid7's case shows that the useful signal sat on the endpoint, in the parent-child relationship between the Java process and a shell.

The attacker then ran hundreds of hex-encoded shell commands and scripts pulled from temporary Pinggy and Cloudflare Tunnel domains. Each command wrapped its output in labeled delimiters and carried a sequential task ID, a structure Rapid7 said suggests AI-assisted automated tooling.

Rapid7 blog post section MDR observed exploitation describing unauthenticated POST requests to the Confluence SOAP endpoint, Java launching Bash and curl, and the attacker moving to MySQL and Microsoft 365.
Image: Rapid7 (fair use).The MDR observed exploitation section of the Rapid7 advisory.

Three minutes to the database

After enumerating the host, network, Confluence configuration, encryption keys and database settings, the attacker was authenticating to MySQL with Confluence's own database credentials just over three minutes after the first observed execution. Queries pulled page bodies, application links and attachments with names tied to credentials, tokens, VPN configurations and private keys. Scripts that Rapid7 described as likely AI-generated then went through Confluence's default attachment store at /var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/attachments/v4/, parsed Office documents, searched for credentials and hunted for payment card numbers, using Luhn checks to discard false hits.

The attacker used a Confluence application credential to query the internal Atlassian Crowd API for users and groups, then ran Impacket's GetNPUsers.py against a domain controller in an AS-REP roasting attempt. That failed. But about four hours after the first exploit request, using credentials stored in Confluence, the attacker had a service account credential and was querying a production cloud data warehouse. About 12 hours in, the attacker signed in to Microsoft 365 as an integration service account using legacy authentication from 192.238.253[.]176, the same address that appeared in the Pinggy tunnel hostname and in earlier exploit requests.

What to patch, and what to hunt

Atlassian lists Confluence Data Center versions 1.x through 9.x as affected when "Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)" is enabled. The setting has been off by default for new installations since version 3.0. Version 9.2.28 is the fix; 10.x removed the feature, and Atlassian Cloud is not affected. If patching must wait, administrators can clear the Remote API setting under General Configuration and Further Configuration. The change takes effect without a restart, although integrations that use the API may stop working. Atlassian says a request to the SOAP endpoint should then return HTTP 403.

Atlassian Support security advisory page titled CVE-2026-90436 - Remote Code Execution in Confluence Data Center, with summary, release date and affected product fields.
Image: Atlassian (fair use).Atlassian's security advisory for CVE-2026-90436 in Confluence Data Center.

For N-central, on-premises administrators should confirm that Legacy API is disabled, even on 2026.4 HF2. N-able says hosted environments received temporary protections, and it has temporarily disabled its Intune integration as a precaution. On Nov. 16, N-able released N-central 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39), which fixes 17 new CVEs and disables Legacy API. Rapid7 recommends upgrading on an emergency basis.

Rapid7 published Confluence indicators: 192.238.253[.]176, 5.133.47[.]243, 163.182.68[.]109, 104.13.106[.]166, *.trycloudflare[.]com, wpefh-192-238-253-176.free.pinggy[.]net and webhook[.]site. N-able's Nov. 13 update lists 157.20.241[.]16, 139.99.69[.]109 and 79.76.51[.]56 for N-central customers who had not disabled Legacy API. Rapid7 cautions that a hit should prompt investigation but that no hit does not clear an environment.

Rapid7 advisory IOCs section listing IP addresses and domains associated with exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Confluence Data Center and N-able N-central.
Image: Rapid7 (fair use).The IOCs section of the Rapid7 advisory.

For responders, the case suggests a short list. Alert on Confluence's Java process spawning shells, curl or wget, whatever the HTTP status of the triggering request. Search access logs for POSTs to the soap-axis1 servlet. Look for outbound connections to Pinggy, Cloudflare Tunnel and webhook.site from application servers. Treat every credential stored in Confluence pages, attachments and application links on an exposed server as compromised, and rotate it. Check whether integration service accounts can still use legacy authentication to Microsoft 365, and review their sign-ins.

About the Author

Noah Park

Noah Park covers incident response, containment, and blue-team operations for SOCtember from New York.

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