Skip to content

Response, New York. Noah Park: Check Point Patches Actively Exploited Management Server Path Traversal. Detection, Dallas. Ava Okello: Report Finds Nearly Half of Deployed Detections Need Attention Before SOCs Can Trust Them.

SOCtember

Always First. Fast SOC News.

Screenshot of the Forescout blog post titled BankWeaver Campaign Abuses Digital Banking Middleware to Deploy Web Shells, by Sai Molige and Forescout Research - Vedere Labs, dated November 19, 2026.
Image: Forescout (fair use). The Forescout Vedere Labs report published on Thursday.

Threat Intel

Forescout Says Intruders Turned an Anonymous Login Token Into Admin Rights on a Bank's Temenos Middleware, Then Installed Web Shells as Ordinary Java Services, and Six More Banks Look Exposed

The campaign, which Forescout calls BankWeaver, needed no stolen password and no software exploit, only an authentication service set to accept anonymous users and reachable from the internet. The attackers ran their tools inside the platform's own service framework and used one victim's servers to stage data stolen from others.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelSingapore7 min read

SINGAPORE - Attackers broke into a financial institution by trading the anonymous token its digital banking platform hands to every visitor for an administrator token, then used the platform's own extension mechanism to install a web shell and a data collection tool as if they were ordinary banking services, researchers at Forescout said on Thursday.

In a report by Sai Molige and the company's Vedere Labs research team, Forescout said it uncovered the campaign while investigating a breach at a financial services institution in early September. The target was Temenos Quantum Fabric, formerly Kony Fabric, middleware that sits between a bank's web and mobile apps and its identity systems, databases, payment services and customer records. Forescout named the campaign BankWeaver.

It confirmed one compromise and found six more banks, in Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the Americas, whose deployments appeared to share the same configuration and exposure. "We have not confirmed compromise," the researchers wrote of those six.

A token for anyone, then a token for admins

When a user opens Temenos Infinity Spotlight, a back-office administration app that runs on Fabric, the browser receives an X-Kony-Authorization JSON Web Token for an anonymous user. In the affected deployment, Forescout said, a Fabric authentication service that issues privileged tokens had been configured to accept anonymous app-user access instead of private access, and it was reachable from the internet. Presented with the anonymous token, it returned a privileged one, granting access to administrative functions including managing running applications and creating new services.

Forescout diagram of the BankWeaver attack chain: a request to the public /apps/spotlight application returns an anonymous JWT, the attacker sends it to the authentication service and receives an admin token, then drops FabricShell and FabricShadow through the administrative plane, with traffic to command, staging and exfiltration servers.
Image: Forescout (fair use).Forescout's summary of the attack chain.

Forescout reported its findings to Temenos, which determined that the behavior resulted from the service being configured for anonymous rather than private access. Temenos released updates and guidance to configure the service as private and advised customers to restrict internet access to Spotlight and to Fabric's administrative and authentication services, according to the report.

Web shells that look like banking services

With an administrator token, the attackers uploaded a zip file through Fabric's workspace import, creating a new integration service that deliberately allowed operating system command injection. They checked it with ls and pwd, opened a reverse shell with netcat and pulled shell scripts from free file hosting sites, Forescout said. Typos and repeated commands showed a person at the keyboard.

They then uploaded two Java archives. The first, which Forescout named FabricShell, registers as a Fabric service and runs any command passed in a cmd parameter through /bin/sh, or, without one, opens a database connection and returns up to 50 rows of a caller's SQL query. The second, FabricShadow, hooks the step that runs before every data request and collects the host name, network addresses, environment variable names, Java version, service account, process ID, the output of the id command and listings of /tmp and the working directory. It wraps the output in markers such as RECON_PREPROCESSOR and RECON_FROM_FABRIC, sends it to a command server in a POST request with a custom X-A: k1 header and leaves a copy in /tmp.

Screenshot of the Forescout report describing FabricShadow, listing the host details it collects and the RECON_PREPROCESSOR, RECON_DONE, RECON_ERR and RECON_FROM_FABRIC markers and X-A: k1 header, followed by the Attacker Infrastructure section.
Image: Forescout (fair use).Forescout's description of FabricShadow and the attackers' infrastructure.

Because the code ran inside the middleware's trusted service framework, the researchers wrote, it inherited the application's process identity, network access, database connections and normal request paths. "What seemed like normal application traffic became attacker-controlled command execution, database access, host reconnaissance, data collection and exfiltration."

Victims as infrastructure

The tools also exposed other victims. FabricShell carried hard-coded PostgreSQL connection details and credentials for a second organization as a fallback, and FabricShadow carried a hard-coded address for that organization's Red Hat Process Automation Manager, which turned out to be a web shell collecting data stolen from other victims. The original anonymous token request that started Forescout's investigation came from a compromised server.

Forescout counted more than 30 IP addresses rotated through the campaign, most of them compromised residential devices in Britain, such as network storage boxes and home routers with exposed CWMP management, and a handful of virtual private servers. It did not attribute the campaign to a known group.

What SOC teams can hunt

Forescout published a layered checklist for organizations running Temenos digital banking components, starting with confirming that Fabric authentication and backend services are private and applying Temenos's configuration updates. For security operations teams, the practical hooks are:

  • Anonymous application tokens presented to administrative or user-store authentication services, and any public anonymous context that receives a higher-privilege token.
  • Zip imports, JAR registration, service publication, exports and deletions on Fabric treated as privileged changes and alerted on.
  • Java or Tomcat processes spawning sh, bash, curl, wget, nc, tar or pigz, and outbound connections from middleware on nonstandard ports such as 5005, 5006 and 25565.
  • The names ReconJavaService, recon.ReconService, ReconPreProcessor and recon_svc.jar, the file /tmp/.recon_out, the RECON_* markers and the X-A: k1 header.
Screenshot of the Mitigation Recommendations: Detection, Containment, and Remediation section of the Forescout report, with a table of detection and validation steps by layer: edge routing, identity, authorization and application change.
Image: Forescout (fair use).Part of Forescout's detection and validation table.

For containment, the report advises removing direct internet access to identity, user management, payment, /mfconsole and /workspace routes, revoking Kony, OAuth, JWT and session tokens, rotating application, database and integration secrets, treating secrets that appear in WAF and application logs as compromised, preserving disk, memory, logs and JARs before cleanup and rebuilding affected nodes from known-good images rather than deleting files one by one.

About the Author

Priya Shah

Priya Shah covers threat intelligence, intrusion analysis, and adversary tradecraft for SOCtember from Singapore.

Related stories

Threat Intel desk