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Infoblox Threat Intel graphic for a wallet-drainer kit that uses DNS TXT records and public DNS-over-HTTPS as a live control plane.
Image: Infoblox Threat Intel, Noir wallet-drainer DNS C2 investigation thumbnail, Oct 9, 2026 (fair use).

Threat Intel

Infoblox Tracks Noir Wallet Drainer Using DNS TXT and DoH as a Live C2 Control Plane

Infoblox Threat Intel describes a wallet-drainer kit that races public DNS-over-HTTPS resolvers for a TXT record naming its current Cloudflare Pages pool, then steals through spending permissions rather than seed phrases.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelSingapore5 min read

SINGAPORE - Infoblox Threat Intel on Oct. 9, 2026 detailed Noir, a cryptocurrency wallet-drainer kit that treats DNS as a live control plane rather than a one-time lookup. While investigating a fake crypto voting page, researchers found a loader that does not hard-code a durable link to its operational backend. Before the drain flow starts, the loader races three public DNS-over-HTTPS services for a TXT record at _r.noir[.]black and uses the first valid answer to learn which Cloudflare Pages pool is currently active. Infoblox frames the design as separating long-lived lure pages from short-lived infrastructure so operators can rotate the pool by changing one DNS answer instead of rebuilding every deployed lure.

Diagram of Noir lure pages querying a DNS TXT record over DoH to learn the active Cloudflare Pages drainer pool.
Figure: Infoblox Threat Intel, Figure 1, attack flow and DNS C2 element of the Noir crypto draining service, Oct 9, 2026 (fair use).The lure queries DNS before the drain flow starts.

The victim path does not require a seed phrase, password, or private key. After a standard wallet-connection step that shares the public address, Noir asks its backend for a plan tailored to that wallet's holdings and network, then seeks spending permissions or typed-data signatures that can look less alarming than an explicit transfer. Captured approvals are submitted immediately; the kit's own log language describes this as draining at capture, with the attacker-side relayer exercising the grant from its infrastructure. When the flow finishes, the kit disconnects the WalletConnect session so the malicious app no longer sits in the wallet's connected-applications list.

On the wire, the loader in the samples Infoblox reviewed starts from JavaScript embedded in the lure, including a decimal character-code array that decodes into the loader. One example lure hosted on listchoiseopenleaderboardseptember[.]netlify[.]app loaded a script that completed that initialization. The observed DoH providers were Google Public DNS and two Cloudflare endpoints, including direct access to 1.1.1.1. A concurrent API request to noir[.]black can return an independently resolved fallback pool for networks where direct DoH fails. Infoblox observed render-984.pages[.]dev among returned pool domains. The kit caches the pool hostname in local storage for 60 seconds to match the TXT record's 60-second TTL; comments in the shipped code say an earlier, longer cache kept sending visitors to retired hosts after rotation, and a failed readiness check clears the cache and retries with the server-provided fallback.

Screenshot of Noir pool bootstrap script that loads index.js and builds per-deployment configuration.
Figure: Infoblox Threat Intel, Figure 2, script from the domain returned in the dynamic DNS TXT record loading the engine via index.js with a WalletConnect project ID, observed on render-984.pages.dev, Oct 9, 2026 (fair use).The returned pool host loads the engine and a WalletConnect project ID.

The source is unusually self-documenting. Plain-English comments discuss dead pool hosts after TXT flips, a wallet prompt that exposed the canonical origin, framing bugs that turned pages white, and a requirement that closing the flow always carry a reason. Infoblox assesses that the verbosity and support-ticket style language make AI-assisted creation and maintenance likely, while noting a human developer could have written the same notes. Shared infrastructure, common wallet-connection project identifiers, and lure themes spanning fake community votes, airdrops, DEX clones, eligibility checks, and brand spoofs point to a shared service rather than a single one-off actor. Prior Infoblox work on Detour Dog and Decoy Dog is cited as earlier DNS TXT control-plane tradecraft.

Code comment collage from Noir scripts discussing TXT rotation, framing bugs, and operator support traces.
Figure: Infoblox Threat Intel, Figure 4, various plain-English comments found in pieces of the Noir Drainer kit scripts, Oct 9, 2026 (fair use).Plain-English comments document rotation and framing bugs.

For SOC and DNS defenders, the published indicators and the architectural takeaway matter more than the victim set. Monitor TXT queries for _r.noir[.]black, block noir[.]black and observed pool hostnames such as render-984.pages[.]dev, and treat unexpected browser-originated DoH to public resolvers as a hunting surface. Infoblox says risk-averse networks may want to block public DoH and fully monitor enterprise DNS, because encrypted public DoH lets the kit bypass the corporate resolver path. Blocking only a previously seen pool does not stop the next TXT answer. The Oct. 9 post does not publish a victim census or dollar-loss total; it is a primary analysis of the kit's DNS C2 design, permission-based theft model, and self-healing rotation logic.

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Priya Shah covers threat intelligence, adversary tradecraft, and supply-chain campaigns for SOCtember from Singapore.

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