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Kaspersky Securelist featured art for Operation ShadowCloud: a cloud of dark smoke streaked with green and red light pushing through a glass partition into a dim office.
Image: Kaspersky (fair use). Featured image from the Securelist Operation ShadowCloud posts, published Nov. 17, 2026.

Threat Intel

Kaspersky Says Operation ShadowCloud Used MeshAgent to Plant Two New Backdoors That Take Orders Through GitHub, SharePoint and Ably, Hitting Government Networks in Asia and Africa

GitDoor files victim check-ins as GitHub issues and GraphDoor signs in to Microsoft Graph as an app to read commands from a SharePoint list, so the C2 traffic looks like ordinary enterprise cloud use. Kaspersky found overlaps with Chinese-speaking groups but stops short of attribution.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelSingapore6 min read

SINGAPORE - An espionage campaign aimed mainly at government organizations in Asia and Africa has been running its command and control through GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint and the Ably messaging service, letting its traffic pass as routine cloud use, according to a two-part report published Tuesday by Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team.

Kaspersky said it identified the campaign, which it named Operation ShadowCloud, in early 2026. The operators abuse the legitimate MeshAgent remote management utility to drop two previously undocumented backdoors that Kaspersky named after their C2 platforms: GitDoor and GraphDoor. Both download plug-ins on demand and inject shellcode directly into memory. Kaspersky said Sophos had touched on a fragment of the campaign in a recent brief.

The researchers wrote that "cloud API calls to Microsoft Graph, GitHub, and Ably are indistinguishable from legitimate enterprise usage, evading many network-based detections," which is why the report matters more to endpoint hunters than to network teams.

MeshAgent and side-loading

In a Taiwanese organization, Kaspersky found two instances of the MeshCentral Agent (MD5 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b) hard-coded to reach wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx. The exact entry point is unknown, the researchers said, but evidence points to reuse of an earlier infection already on the network. Through the agent, the operators dropped a legitimate executable, a malicious loader DLL and an encrypted config.ini holding the backdoor.

The side-loaded pairs included a Sandboxie Start binary with a malicious SbieDll.dll in C:\windows\system32, and a Python application with python39.dll under C:\Windows\System32\dts\pc\apo4x. Kaspersky also listed jli.dll loaded by the OpenJDK platform binary javaw.exe, WINMM.dll by the Sysinternals ZoomIt tool and libcef.dll. One loader family decrypts the payload with RC4 and then XOR; another uses XOR alone. One variant passes the decrypted bytes through Windows' Ethernet MAC address conversion functions to rebuild the backdoor in memory, then jumps to its MZ header, which acts as a trampoline into bootstrap code.

Disassembly from Kaspersky's analysis showing the bootstrap code at the start of the decrypted backdoor image, where the MZ header bytes are executed as instructions that compute an address and call into the payload.
Image: Kaspersky (fair use)."Execution from MZ bytes," from Part 1 of the Securelist report.

GitDoor: commands in a repository

GitDoor decrypts a GitHub repository URL, a personal access token and HTTP headers, then uses two repositories under the account LatonyCharnleyaW: Havo, from which it downloads commands and plug-ins, and Trix, where it uploads victim data and command results. It registers each new victim by opening an issue in Trix and stores encrypted system information in a file named main.<victim code>.js.map, posing as a JavaScript source map, in both GitHub and Ably at rest.ably.io. Kaspersky listed nine GitHub accounts in its indicators and said repository creation dates suggest the infrastructure was being prepared since at least the end of 2024.

Screenshot of the Securelist report's GitDoor section, explaining that the backdoor decrypts its GitHub C2 details and uses two repositories, /repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo to download commands and plug-ins and /repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix to upload victim information and command results.
Image: Kaspersky Securelist (fair use).Screenshot of the GitDoor section of Part 1, captured Nov. 17, 2026.

The shellcode GitDoor can deliver, mostly as COFF objects, covers process injection through CreateRemoteThread, thread hijacking, NtQueueApcThread and KernelCallbackTable manipulation, plus Windows service enumeration and creation.

GraphDoor: an app sign-in to Microsoft Graph

GraphDoor authenticates as an application, not a user. It sends a client credentials request to login.microsoftonline.com with a hard-coded tenant path, client ID and client secret, receives a token for Microsoft Graph, and writes victim data to a main.<victim code>.js.map file in a SharePoint document library on buildersemp.sharepoint[.]com. It then pulls three plug-ins from a SharePoint list, scr.ts for screenshots, pr.ts for process listing and kl.ts for keylogging, and polls the same list for command items addressed to the victim. On the host it creates a working folder under C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log and a named pipe in the form \\.\pipe\p followed by its process ID.

The operators also deploy a modified build of the open-source Erfrp reverse proxy and an Ably channel proxy to relay traffic between infected machines and their servers. Kaspersky said the backdoor does not embed a hard-coded C2 domain; it learns the host and port through the proxy plug-in or an Ably channel.

Attribution, carefully

Kaspersky said it lacks enough information to attribute the activity definitively. On several victim systems, implants from the Chinese-speaking groups FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle shared staging directories with GitDoor and were deployed within a day of it. In one case, FamousSparrow tooling sat in %ProgramData%\excint\ on March 6, 2026, a day after GitDoor was staged in a subfolder of the same directory. Two proxy IPs, 103[.]106[.]230[.]33 and 123[.]58[.]205[.]105, resolve to ms[.]twnic[.]top and ekmt[.]tw, domains also used as Cobalt Strike C2 for beacons found on GraphDoor-infected machines.

Screenshot of the Attribution section of the Securelist report, describing overlaps with FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle and a table comparing FamousSparrow's %ProgramData%\excint staging directory, created March 6, 2026, with GitDoor's %ProgramData%\excint\sg directory, created March 5, 2026.
Image: Kaspersky Securelist (fair use).Screenshot of the Attribution section of Part 2, captured Nov. 17, 2026.

What defenders can hunt

Kaspersky's own advice is that introducing a tool like MeshCentral into an environment "should be treated as a suspicious event." For a SOC, our reading of the report suggests these starting points:

  • Inventory remote management agents and alert on MeshAgent or MeshCentral that IT did not deploy, especially connections to wss endpoints such as 27.102.66[.]162.
  • Hunt for legitimate binaries running from unusual system paths next to a config.ini and a DLL they would load, such as start.exe with SbieDll.dll in System32 or dtsapo4service.exe with python39.dll.
  • Review Entra ID sign-in logs for service principal (client credentials) sign-ins from workstations, and Microsoft Graph activity from non-browser processes writing .js.map files to SharePoint.
  • Look for processes other than browsers and developer tools calling api.github.com or rest.ably.io, and for the C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log folder.

The report's indicators include MD5 hashes 552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035 for GitDoor and 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952 for GraphDoor, the loader hashes, the GitHub accounts, the SharePoint site and the proxy servers.

About the Author

Priya Shah

Priya Shah covers threat intelligence, intrusion analysis, and adversary tradecraft for SOCtember from Singapore.

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