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Cisco Talos Threat Spotlight header art: the words Talos Threat Spotlight in gold and white under a cone of light on a dark background.
Image: Cisco Talos (fair use). Threat Spotlight header art from the Talos post on UAT-12643, published Nov. 18, 2026.

Threat Intel

Talos Says a Suspected North Korea-Aligned Group Hides Its Command Servers in Solana Transaction Memos and Plants Its Overlord RAT Where Windows "Reset This PC" Will Run It Again

Cisco Talos tracks the financially motivated cluster as UAT-12643 and found its toolkit on a staging server left open to the internet: a Go-based RAT, a public Python stealer called Good Game and a cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker. Talos ties it to North Korea with low confidence.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelSingapore6 min read

SINGAPORE - A financially motivated hacking group that Cisco Talos tracks as UAT-12643 stores the addresses of its command servers in memos attached to Solana blockchain transactions and gives its remote access trojan a way to survive a full Windows reset, according to research Talos published on Wednesday.

Talos said it found the group's tools after the actor left the root folder of a staging server at 41[.]216[.]188[.]11 exposed. The server ran a Flask file-delivery service on port 8000, and the exposed directory showed the toolset and the ports configured for each service: 5173 for the Overlord RAT's WebSocket command channel, and 5656 and 5959 for two builds of a Python stealer. The arsenal included the Go-based Overlord RAT, a publicly available Python infostealer labeled Good Game and a multi-currency clipboard hijacker. Lure names point at cryptocurrency holders, gamers, finance staff, Viber users and operators of the MicroSIP softphone, and the stealer's keyword list covers English, French, Spanish and Portuguese file names, which Talos said suggests a focus on victims in Europe.

A blockchain dead drop

The Overlord variant does not hard-code its server. It asks a Solana RPC node for the transaction history of a wallet the actor controls, fetches each transaction with jsonParsed encoding and looks for a memo instruction whose data is exactly 43 characters long, the length of the actor's encrypted WebSocket URL. Everything else, including legitimate memos from other users, is skipped. To move the server, the actor posts one new transaction, and every deployed implant picks up the change on its next check.

Disassembly snippet from Cisco Talos showing an Overlord RAT function that loads a hard-coded Solana Memo Program address and calls a getMemoFromTransaction routine.
Image: Cisco Talos (fair use).Figure 8 from the Talos post, the Overlord RAT function that queries the Solana Memo address.

The technique is not new, but it is hard to take down: a ledger entry cannot be seized the way a domain can. Talos said Lazarus was first reported using Solana memos for this purpose in March 2026 through Node.js, and that a cluster called UNK_DeadDrop, likely North Korean, used Overlord in earlier campaigns reported in June. Both overlaps underpin the low-confidence North Korea assessment. Talos also noted that other actors use Overlord and the Solana technique, which limits how far the link can be pushed.

Hard to kill, harder to wipe

Overlord exposes 35 commands covering keylogging, webcam, microphone and screen capture, file operations, command execution with live output, a reverse SOCKS proxy for reaching internal hosts and in-memory plugin loading through reflective DLL injection. When it runs with administrator rights, it marks its own process as critical through NtSetInformationProcess, so forcibly terminating it crashes the machine with a CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED blue screen.

For persistence it uses a randomly named Run key value under the current user and a second, rarer path: it writes a copy of itself with a random 20-character name into the Recovery\OEM folder and patches ResetConfig.xml, the file that governs what the Windows Recovery Environment does during a reset, to register a batch script that starts it. Whenever the victim chooses "Reset this PC," WinRE runs the implant before the operating system is restored. The command relies on %TARGETOSDRIVE%, a variable that resolves only inside WinRE.

Disassembly snippet from Cisco Talos showing an Overlord RAT function that writes files to the Windows Recovery Environment OEM folder and configures a reset script.
Image: Cisco Talos (fair use).Figure 7 from the Talos post, the Overlord RAT function that configures its script in the WinRE location.

Living-off-the-land delivery

Talos has not seen how the first-stage files reach victims, but it described three of them. One shortcut poses as a PDF and calls MpCmdRun.exe, Microsoft Defender's command-line tool, with -DownloadFile to fetch a payload saved as RuntimeBroker.exe. A second uses certutil -urlcache -f. An HTA file run by mshta.exe writes a payload to %TEMP%\s.exe, and an MSBuild project file, dl.xml, compiles inline C# in memory and downloads with a spoofed Microsoft BITS/7.8 User-Agent. The actor's own shortcut builder was on the server, and both sample shortcuts were built on a machine named win-8oa3ccqae4d.

PowerShell shortcut generation script from Cisco Talos that builds a Windows LNK with a spoofed document icon and a hidden download command.
Image: Cisco Talos (fair use).Figure 1 from the Talos post, the actor's Windows shortcut generation script.

Good Game, a public stealer the actor did not write, checks for sandboxes by DLL names, virtual machine MAC prefixes, less than 2 GB of RAM, under five minutes of uptime and Wine, then opens a decoy financial PDF. It zips browser credentials, wallets, game launcher and Telegram sessions and documents whose names match its keyword list, uploads the archive to gofile[.]io and posts the download link and a host profile to a Discord webhook. The clipboard hijacker checks the clipboard every 500 milliseconds, swaps in attacker wallet addresses and persists as %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe under a Run value of the same name, posing as an Edge updater.

What defenders can use

Talos published ClamAV signatures, including Win.Trojan.OverlordRAT-10060615-0 and Win.Infostealer.GoodGame-10060617-0, Snort 2 SIDs 1:67490 and 1:67491, Snort 3 SIDs 7:74 and 7:75, and indicators on its GitHub repository. For hunting, the behaviors are more durable than the hashes: MpCmdRun.exe with -DownloadFile, certutil with -urlcache, mshta or msbuild.exe making outbound requests, unexpected changes under Recovery\OEM or to ResetConfig.xml, workstation processes calling Solana RPC endpoints, uploads to gofile and Discord webhooks, and a binary named MsgEdgeUpdate.exe in a user's AppData folder. Because of the WinRE persistence, a machine that Overlord touched should be reimaged from trusted media rather than reset in place.

About the Author

Priya Shah

Priya Shah covers threat intelligence, intrusion analysis, and adversary tradecraft for SOCtember from Singapore.

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