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Trellix diagram of the Sirius Backdoor infection chain: a FedEx email with a ZIP attachment holding Fedex_tax_receipt.pdf, a PDF Launch action that starts hidden PowerShell with an encoded command, a .NET assembly loaded in memory and decrypted with RC4, a second .NET stage that downloads zeus.dat and picks a random host process, and a final VC++ payload identified as the Sirius Backdoor.
Image: Trellix (fair use). Figure 1, the infection chain, from Trellix's report published Oct. 26, 2026.

Threat Intel

Trellix Says a Blank FedEx Tax Invoice PDF Aimed at South Korean Users Launches PowerShell That Loads a New Sirius Backdoor Entirely in Memory After Silencing ETW

The previously undocumented backdoor offers hidden desktop control, webcam and microphone capture, a cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker and Chromium credential theft, and can persist through a Windows provisioning package that survives a reset. Trellix published hashes, the command server and hunting guidance.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelSingapore6 min read

SINGAPORE - A phishing campaign aimed at South Korean users disguises itself as a FedEx tax invoice and delivers a previously undocumented backdoor without writing its working code to disk, according to an analysis published this week by Trellix. The researchers named the malware the Sirius Backdoor after a configuration marker, SIRIUS_STUB_CONFIG, found in the binary.

Trellix's Threat Response Team found the campaign during a priority customer escalation that began with an alert for the unexpected execution of a PDF document. "What initially appeared to be a routine phishing attempt quickly unfolded into a sophisticated, multistage campaign," wrote the researchers Shashikala Piddannavar, Raymond Joseph Alfonso and Sagar Bade.

A blank invoice that runs PowerShell

Trellix screenshot of the Korean-language phishing email from FedEx Korea, styled as a FedEx Billing Online notice that a tax invoice has been issued, listing invoice number 724156148 and an amount of 217,740 KRW, with the attachment Fedex_tax_receipt.zip highlighted.
Image: Trellix (fair use).Figure 2, the phishing email with its ZIP attachment.

The email, in Korean, mimics an automated FedEx Billing Online notification about a new tax invoice for 217,740 KRW, with an invoice number and a payment deadline. The attachment is a ZIP archive, Fedex_tax_receipt.zip, which holds Fedex_tax_receipt.pdf. Trellix said the language and currency point to a campaign aimed at corporate users or accounting staff in the region.

The PDF is visually blank by design. Its startup instruction, /OpenAction, points to a /Launch action that runs powershell.exe with a hidden window, no profile, no interactive prompts, an execution policy bypass and a Base64-encoded command. Execution still depends on the user approving the PDF reader's security confirmation prompt, the researchers noted.

Trellix screenshot of the raw PDF structure, showing the catalog object with /OpenAction pointing to object 8 and object 8 defining a /Launch action for powershell.exe with the arguments -W h -nop -NOni -ep BYPaSS -EncodedCommand followed by a long encoded string.
Image: Trellix (fair use).Figure 3, the raw PDF structure with the /Launch action highlighted.

Four layers, all in memory

The PowerShell command decrypts an AES-encrypted, GZip-compressed blob with hardcoded keys and loads the result as a .NET assembly through reflection, so the first-stage loader never touches the disk. That loader derives an RC4 key through SHA256 and decrypts its resources. It then rebuilds the next stage by taking every third byte of the decrypted buffer, a step Trellix says is designed to hide the MZ header from memory scanners, since the other 66% of the data is randomized junk.

The second-stage injector goes after the sensors first. It patches EtwEventWrite in ntdll.dll so that Event Tracing for Windows stops reporting, and patches a hot-patching function as well. It then downloads the final payload, zeus.dat, from dubaitechnicalservice.ae, and uses Early Bird APC injection to hollow out a randomly chosen legitimate process such as msbuild.exe or svchost.exe and run the backdoor inside it.

Trellix screenshot of decompiled code for PatchETW and PatchNtManageHotPatch, which hook EtwEventWrite and the hot-patching function in ntdll so the injector can blind endpoint telemetry.
Image: Trellix (fair use).Figure 7, the anti-EDR routines in the stage 2 injector.

What the backdoor does

Trellix describes Sirius as going well beyond commodity remote access tools. Its capabilities include a hidden virtual desktop for silent interactive control, custom virtual display drivers, a built-in SOCKS5 proxy for pivoting, live webcam, microphone and system audio capture, keystroke logging tied to active window titles, and real-time clipboard theft. A configurable clipboard hijacker swaps cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, and the malware harvests autofill data, cookies and saved credentials from Chromium-based browsers. It can add Windows Defender exclusions, change firewall policy and delete Volume Shadow Copies.

The backdoor also checks whether a victim is in one of about 88 supported countries, including South Korea, the United States, Canada, Australia and European nations, and exits if there is no match.

Its persistence options are the part most likely to slip past routine hunts. With administrator rights, Trellix says, Sirius can write a Run key into the Default User hive so every new account inherits the infection, drop a provisioning package under C:\Recovery\Customizations\ that Windows Push-Button Reset restores, and create C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\SetupComplete.cmd to run with SYSTEM rights after setup or an upgrade. Other options include a Startup folder shortcut and a logon script registered under the UserInitMgrLogonScriptName value in HKCU\Environment. Without admin rights, it copies itself into user folders and plants updater.vbs in the Startup folder with a RUNASADMIN compatibility flag that triggers a UAC elevation prompt.

What defenders can do

Trellix's recommendations map directly onto the chain:

  • Enable the Microsoft Defender attack surface reduction rule that blocks Adobe Reader from creating child processes (GUID 7674ba52-37eb-4a4f-a9a1-f0f9a1619a2c).
  • Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode through AppLocker or WDAC, and enable Script Block Logging, watching Event ID 4104.
  • Alert on PDF applications spawning PowerShell, script engines launching msbuild.exe and unexpected processes creating svchost.exe, and on processes created suspended followed by cross-process memory writes, NtQueueApcThread and thread resumption.
  • Audit for unexpected .ppkg files under C:\Recovery\Customizations\, UserInitMgrLogonScriptName under HKCU\Environment, SetupComplete.cmd and RUNASADMIN entries under AppCompatFlags\Layers.

The report lists hashes for the email, ZIP, PDF, both .NET stages and the backdoor, including the Sirius SHA-256 d6802fce5b918ed247ba85d6aa0545a8120cfbc3734b1c37794c4e381862d4ee and the PDF SHA-256 6da827caff789c1c33dd9ad380c610541f6dd90678db527c4f5bdf5012e305d4. The network indicators are the payload URL hxxps://dubaitechnicalservice.ae/prood/zeus.dat and the command server 185.114.206.45 on port 4449.

About the Author

Priya Shah

Priya Shah covers threat intelligence, intrusion analysis, and adversary tradecraft for SOCtember from Singapore.

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