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Huntress graphic titled CVE-2026-84869: ScreenConnect file transfer spray campaign, listing 688,000+ guest run file requests for update*.bat, 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers sprayed of 851 examined, 29 attacker IP addresses and 7 technicians connected while an attacker pushed a file, with 2 confirmed runs on technician PCs.
Image: Huntress (fair use). Figure 1 from the Huntress post, the spray campaign by the numbers, data as of Nov. 16, 2026.

Detection

Huntress Counts 688,000 Guest Requests to Run Batch Files on 42 MSP ScreenConnect Servers, Waiting for a Technician on an Unpatched Client to Join, and Confirms CVE-2026-84869 Is Being Exploited

On Nov. 12 a technician joined a blank-named session and, in about nine seconds, a guest-pushed batch file installed a rogue ScreenConnect client branded as Windows Update. Huntress says many technicians were still on 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 clients weeks after the 26.6.5 fix shipped.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon6 min read

LONDON - Attackers have been sitting in remote support sessions on managed service providers' ScreenConnect servers and asking, hundreds of thousands of times, for the technician's computer to run a batch file, according to research published Monday by the security company Huntress. The bet is that sooner or later a technician on an unpatched client will join.

Huntress said it has confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-84869, a flaw in the ScreenConnect host client that technicians use. ConnectWise disclosed it on Sept. 8 with a CVSS score of 9.9 and said that in both Support and Access sessions a guest could trigger file-transfer actions that the technician's client processed without authorization or confirmation, including running the file with elevated rights. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on Sept. 11. The fixed version for host clients and Access agents is 26.6.5.

"From the technician's view, no prompt appears," Huntress wrote. A technician only has to join the session, whether it belongs to an attacker-controlled machine or to a real customer's support session that the attacker has slipped into as an extra guest.

Nine seconds on a technician's workstation

On Nov. 12, a technician at one MSP joined a blank-named Access session on the MSP's own server. At 16:46:20 UTC the host client ran a guest-pushed file, update_224ac089.bat, from the client's Documents Temp folder. Within the next nine seconds, according to the process telemetry Huntress published, the script relaunched itself hidden, reported the new victim to a Telegram bot, checked the Windows build and its admin rights, downloaded hxxps://masterdarky[.]com/WindowsUpdate.msi, unpacked it with msiexec /a so that no install record was left, set the Secondary Logon service to start automatically and launched WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, a rebranded ScreenConnect client connected to the attacker's relay on port 8041.

Huntress diagram of the CVE-2026-84869 exploitation chain observed on one MSP technician workstation on Nov. 12, 2026, from a malicious guest session requesting update_<8hex>.bat, through the technician joining on a client older than 26.6.5, the stage 2 download from masterdarky[.]com and a silent msiexec extract, to a rogue WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe connecting to masterdarky[.]com on port 8041.
Image: Huntress (fair use).Figure 2 from the Huntress post, the exploitation chain on a technician workstation, Nov. 12, 2026.

The spray

The delivery side shows up in the servers' own databases. Across 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers between Oct. 20 and Nov. 16, Huntress said, attacker guests made 688,000 run-file requests for files named update.bat or update_ followed by eight hex characters, from 29 source IP addresses. On the busiest server, 10 guest sessions from seven IPs made 70,414 requests over three weeks.

The exact file behind the Nov. 12 compromise was sprayed at five MSP servers beginning within two seconds of each other at 16:03 UTC that day, 43 minutes before the compromise. Each server received it between 585 and 5,671 times. Huntress said it assesses with high confidence that the spray operator and the masterdarky[.]com operator are the same.

The spray guests tend to have blank session names or default-looking Windows hostnames, claim a client version matching the server's own build, and show no preview image or only a JPEG. All five sessions that sprayed update_224ac089.bat, and 27 spray sessions on 17 servers in total, had the session's Company property set to "crypto client."

Huntress bar chart of guest run file requests for update.bat-style files on 17 anonymized MSP ScreenConnect servers, ranked from 70,414 requests on the busiest server down to 14,684, with markers on the servers that also received update_224ac089.bat, the file behind the Nov. 12 compromise.
Image: Huntress (fair use).Spray requests per ScreenConnect server, anonymized and ranked, from the Huntress post.

Canaries and a Startup folder

Not every attempt was blind. On Nov. 13 at 01:49 UTC a technician at another MSP joined a session presenting as a laptop; two seconds later the guest pushed marker.txt, and about three seconds after that the technician's client opened it in Notepad++. Huntress called it a canary, a harmless file that proves the exploit works before anything real is sent. About a minute earlier the same technician had joined one of the unrelated crypto-exchange-named decoy sessions Huntress reported on Nov. 13.

In October, on one MSP's server, an attacker joined three real customer support sessions as an additional guest and asked the technician's client to run ../../../AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/STARTM~1/Programs/Startup/Sync.bat, a path that would plant a script in the technician's own Startup folder. Two of those technicians were on vulnerable Windows clients; the third was on a Mac, where the Windows path failed. Huntress said many technicians in these cases were still running 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 clients weeks after the fix shipped.

Huntress timeline of spray activity per ScreenConnect server and technician exposure events from Oct. 19 to Nov. 16, 2026.
Image: Huntress (fair use).Figure 4 from the Huntress post, spray activity per server and technician-exposure events, Oct. 19 to Nov. 16, 2026.

Where to look

Huntress stresses that updating the server does not fix this, because the vulnerable code runs on the technician's machine; the server's connection history records which client version each technician used. If clients cannot be patched today, ConnectWise advises removing the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups. For hunting, Huntress recommends:

  • On the server, working on a copy of App_Data\Session.db, look for RanFiles (EventType 85) or SentFiles (86) events from a guest connection (ProcessType 2), especially repeated update*.bat requests in blank-named sessions, marker.txt, Run-Lateral.bat, svc_payload.cmd, or any path containing ../, then check whether a host connection (ProcessType 1) was open at that moment.
  • On technician workstations, alert when ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe or a branded client spawns cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe or Notepad for .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs, .js or .txt files under Documents\*\Temp\, especially with RunFile in the parent's arguments.
  • Look for msiexec /a with TARGETDIR under %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_ plus eight hex characters, followed by runas /trustlevel:0x20000, and for unexpected files in the Startup folder such as Sync.bat.
  • Watch outbound ScreenConnect relay connections, often on port 8041, to domains you do not own.

If there is a hit, Huntress says to isolate the workstation, remove the rogue client and its folder, restore the Secondary Logon start type, rotate every credential reachable from that machine, including RMM, PSA, ScreenConnect, password vault and customer admin accounts, and "assume the attacker could see everything the technician could." Its indicators include masterdarky[.]com and its IP 194.15.36[.]33, the SHA-256 f8871b1561d5c77c297378a7f49c84de52a01ff297395544f0e95d13ef972841 for the rogue client, and sprayer addresses including 162.35.40[.]249, 64.20.44[.]120, 103.195.102[.]66, 103.195.102[.]76 and 199.127.60[.]150.

Huntress separates this campaign from the SCKit worm that hit hundreds of managed endpoints the same week, which it says appears to abuse a vulnerable server-side extension rather than exploit CVE-2026-84869 directly, while attempting to stage it as a trap for later technicians.

About the Author

Ava Okello

Ava Okello covers detection engineering, EDR telemetry, and SOC hunting for SOCtember from London.

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