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Screenshot of the Rapid7 blog post titled Spying on Governments with Zero Lines of Malware: A Custom SoftEther Bridge in Webworm's Toolkit, by Milan Spinka, published November 19, 2026.
Image: Rapid7 (fair use). The Rapid7 Labs post published on Thursday.

Detection

Rapid7 Says China-Aligned Webworm Rebuilt the SoftEther VPN Bridge From Source to Strip Out Every Easy Detection, and Only One Antivirus Engine Flags It

The tool, branded internally as NtMonitor, adds no backdoor at all. It renames the protocol's web endpoints, swaps the handshake watermark for a fragment of a Windows logo, hides its resource archive inside the executable and encrypts its configuration, so the signatures defenders wrote after earlier Webworm reports no longer match.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon6 min read

LONDON - A China-aligned espionage group that targets government networks has started running its own rebuilt copy of SoftEther, the open-source VPN software, after its use of the stock version was publicly documented, researchers at Rapid7 said on Thursday, and the rebuild was designed to defeat the specific ways security teams look for it.

The tool contains no new malicious functionality, according to Milan Spinka of Rapid7 Labs. Instead, it is a modified build of the SoftEther VPN Bridge, version 4.44 build 9807, compiled from the public source code with changes that remove the files, strings, network patterns and configuration formats that detection engineers typically key on. Rapid7 attributed the tool, which calls itself NtMonitor internally, to the group known as Webworm with moderate confidence.

"Clearly, the threat actor prioritizes stealth above raw capability," Rapid7 wrote. The only public sample has been on VirusTotal since January, the company said, and at the time of its analysis only one antivirus vendor detected it.

Why a VPN bridge is enough

Webworm, whose activity Rapid7 said focuses on governmental organizations, especially in Europe, had already been seen installing stock SoftEther VPN inside compromised government networks to keep quiet, long-term access, a tactic ESET documented earlier. A SoftEther bridge does not need a backdoor to be useful to an intruder: in every decrypted configuration Rapid7 examined, the software was set to cascade a remote network into the victim's local network, turning the compromised machine into a bridge between the two.

Where the remote address was not a likely test, it sat in AS 20473, which belongs to The Constant Company, the parent of the hosting provider Vultr, a network Rapid7 said has been associated with Webworm many times before. ESET noted earlier this year that the group was shifting from custom malware to dual-use tools. Rapid7 described the new tool as a hybrid of the two approaches: legitimate software that is not trojanized, but rebuilt in a way that erases much of its fingerprint.

What the rebuild changes

The executable's metadata gives its original file name as netcapa.exe and presents it as "Network Monitor Software" from a company named "Network Systems Solutions Inc." Inside, strings in debug banners, registry keys, firewall rule names and the server's HTTP 401 error page replace "SoftEther VPN" with "NtMonitor VPN." The renaming is inconsistent, Rapid7 noted: the service name used by the entry point is still SEVPNBRIDGE, many registry paths still reference the SoftEther Project, and the debug path left in the binary points to a SoftEtherVPN_Stable build folder on an Administrator desktop.

On the network, stock SoftEther uses the paths /vpnsvc/vpn.cgi and /vpnsvc/connect.cgi. NtMonitor uses /update/alive.cgi and /update/picture.cgi instead.

Screenshot of the Network stealth section of the Rapid7 post, showing stock SoftEther VPN endpoints /vpnsvc/vpn.cgi and /vpnsvc/connect.cgi alongside the NtMonitor replacements /update/alive.cgi and /update/picture.cgi, and describing the replaced handshake watermark.
Image: Rapid7 (fair use).The renamed protocol endpoints as Rapid7 published them.

A SoftEther client proves it speaks the protocol by sending a byte pattern, or watermark, in its handshake; stock builds use a well-known GIF. NtMonitor replaces it with a truncated PNG file showing the Windows logo, so stock SoftEther clients and servers cannot connect to it and its own peers cannot be fingerprinted by the familiar GIF.

Two more changes target host-based detection. Stock SoftEther needs a resource archive named hamcore.se2 sitting next to its executables, which Rapid7 called a straightforward detection opportunity for unauthorized installations. NtMonitor cuts that archive to a bare minimum and packs it inside the executable as a resource, adding about 1.5 megabytes to the file. And where stock SoftEther stores its settings in plain text in vpn_bridge.config, NtMonitor reads a file named setting.conf, encrypted with a custom RC4-like cipher and beginning with the ASCII magic bytes RCEN. The file includes its own encryption key.

What defenders can look for

Rapid7 published indicators of compromise, a YARA ruleset and a Python script that decrypts RCEN configuration files on its Rapid7-Labs GitHub repository. For organizations that can inspect TLS traffic, it said one of the most reliable detections available now is a POST request to /update/picture.cgi with a Content-Type of image/jpeg and a body that begins with the bytes 89 50 4e 47 0d 0a 1a 0a 00 00 00 0d 49 48 44 52, the start of the custom PNG watermark.

Screenshot of the Detection guidance section of the Rapid7 post, recommending a search for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi with Content-Type image/jpeg and a body starting with the PNG header bytes, followed by the MITRE ATT&CK technique table.
Image: Rapid7 (fair use).Rapid7's detection guidance.

For security operations teams, the practical hooks from the report are:

  • Outbound POST requests to /update/picture.cgi or /update/alive.cgi carrying a PNG header in a body labeled as JPEG.
  • A Windows service named SEVPNBRIDGE, or any binary whose version reads 4, 44, 0, 9807 while its file description claims to be network monitoring software.
  • Files named setting.conf that start with RCEN, and firewall rules or registry keys that mention NtMonitor VPN.
  • Long-lived VPN sessions from servers to hosting address space such as AS 20473, which Rapid7 tied to Webworm's remote endpoints.
Screenshot of the Webworm_NtMonitor.yar file in the rapid7/Rapid7-Labs GitHub repository, showing YARA rules that match NtMonitor strings, the SoftEther VPN Bridge PDB path and the encrypted configuration.
Image: Rapid7 via GitHub (fair use).Part of the YARA ruleset Rapid7 released.

Rapid7 cautioned that the strings, endpoints and watermark are the easiest things for the group to change next, even though every sample it has seen kept the NtMonitor branding. It advised government defenders to learn how SoftEther behaves on a host and on the wire, so they are not relying only on artifacts the attacker controls.

About the Author

Ava Okello

Ava Okello covers detection engineering, EDR telemetry, and SOC hunting for SOCtember from London.

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