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Unit 42 header art: a glowing world map drawn in red and blue points of light over a dark circuit-like grid.
Image: Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks (fair use). Header art from the Unit 42 post on TGR-STA-0049, published Nov. 16, 2026.

Detection

Unit 42 Says a Group Spying on Southeast Asian Governments Runs Its RATs Over HTTP/3, Blocks Its Own Operators From Noisy Commands and Fakes Chrome, Web and File Noise to Bury Its Tracks

TGR-STA-0049, also tracked as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon, moved from the Go-based PerfectPioneer RAT to a modular C++ framework called KUKURAT in March 2026. Unit 42 says defenders should log or block outbound UDP 443 and audit domain log-on scripts.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon6 min read

LONDON - A cyberespionage group that has been targeting government entities in Southeast Asia since at least July 2025 talks to its implants over HTTP/3, a protocol most security stacks still inspect poorly, and has built malware that manufactures fake background activity to hide its own, according to research published Monday by Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42.

Unit 42 tracks the cluster as TGR-STA-0049, which overlaps with activity others call REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon, and previously used the Squidoor backdoor, also known as FINALDRAFT. In the campaign it describes, the group deployed two previously undocumented remote access Trojans: PerfectPioneer, first seen in July 2025, and its modular successor KUKURAT, deployed from March 2026 into networks PerfectPioneer had already compromised.

Why HTTP/3 matters to a SOC

Both families use HTTP/3, which runs on the QUIC transport over UDP. Unit 42 notes that enterprise defenses cannot passively intercept TLS on that traffic without breaking the connection, and that firewalls and IDS engines tuned for TCP often give UDP less scrutiny, so outbound UDP 443 "frequently bypass deep packet inspection entirely." PerfectPioneer's newhttp3 variant falls back to HTTP/2 if HTTP/3 fails and talks to four endpoints: /agent/register, /agent/heartbeat, /agent/tasks and /agent/result. KUKURAT exists in an HTTP/2 build and an HTTP/3 build.

How they got in

The primary entry route was exploitation of unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers to plant web shells, including variants of ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5, Unit 42 said. Phishing was a secondary vector, using lookalike government domains and executables disguised as PDFs that open a decoy document, one of them impersonating a 2025 notice from Myanmar's Union Election Commission. PerfectPioneer was also delivered by DLL side-loading from a tampered legitimate executable and by decoy installers, in one case alongside a real GlobalProtect installer used as cover.

Cortex XDR causality view of a compromised web server: w3wp.exe running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM spawns cmd.exe processes that launch PerfectPioneer RAT binaries, including Curl.exe, which then run ipconfig, net user /domain and quser.
Image: Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks (fair use).Figure 1 from the Unit 42 post, PerfectPioneer RAT executed from a web shell, as shown in Cortex XDR.

A RAT that refuses risky orders

Unit 42 recovered six PerfectPioneer variants, distinguished by project paths such as D:/proj/http3/newhttp3/agent/. Two of them, named Pioneer and rat_http3_cc, include a routine called isDangerousCommand that checks each incoming command against a hard-coded blocklist and refuses destructive or forensically noisy instructions. The first layer alone blocks 41 commands, and the list mixes Windows and Linux syntax, which Unit 42 reads as a sign of a parallel Linux build. The researchers called the feature an operational safety switch that keeps operators from making mistakes that could get them detected.

Unit 42 table comparing six PerfectPioneer RAT variants by project path, network protocol, persistence, keylogger, screenshot and SOCKS5 proxy support, and unique features such as process injection, PDF masquerading, token impersonation and the isDangerousCommand feature.
Image: Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks (fair use).Figure 10 from the Unit 42 post, structural matrix of PerfectPioneer RAT variants.

KUKURAT and its noise engine

KUKURAT, written in C++, keeps almost every capability in separate DLL modules pulled from the C2 into memory at runtime, at least 12 of them, covering screenshots and keylogging, host and port scanning, SMB credential brute-forcing, SOCKS tunneling and local privilege elevation. Because the core binary carries no advanced feature code, Unit 42 said, it evades standard binary scans and leaves analysts little to recover.

Its "heuristic camouflage" engine, which operators can toggle per axis from the C2, generates 10 decoy HTTP requests per cycle to random paths on 15 popular websites; writes, reads and deletes random data under HKCU\Software\Google\Chrome\BrowserCrashRecovery and then enumerates HKCU\Software\Google\Update\ClientState to mimic Chrome crash recovery; and constantly creates and deletes randomly named files in %temp%. In one incident a watchdog that keeps KUKURAT running was placed in C:\ProgramData\Cyvera\Ransomware\, a path historically associated with Cortex XDR.

Moving through the domain

The group spread through domain log-on scripts as well as PsExec, WMI and WinRM, and deployed a KUKURAT module, PsExecService.exe, that installs a service named PsExec with a named pipe \\.\pipe\PSEXEC. For credentials it used LSASS dumps, DCSync, Mimikatz, ProcDump, SharpDPAPI and manual SAM and SYSTEM hive dumps. On Exchange, it checked for accounts holding the ApplicationImpersonation role and then granted itself access to every mailbox. Documents in .pdf, .docx, .xlsx and .png formats were the main exfiltration targets.

Cortex XDR causality view showing userinit.exe launching cmd.exe to run an Install batch file from a domain netlogon share, which uses curl.exe to download a Photo.data file and save it as a Photo.exe binary identified as KUKURAT.
Image: Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks (fair use).Figure 5 from the Unit 42 post, KUKURAT deployed via a malicious log-on script, as shown in Cortex XDR.

Detection guidance

Unit 42's recommendations translate directly into SOC work:

  • Log and inspect QUIC at the edge, or block outbound UDP 443 so HTTP/3 falls back to TCP-based channels that existing decryption and inspection can see.
  • Audit SYSVOL and Group Policy log-on scripts for unauthorized changes, and alert on unusual processes running under domain user SIDs during sign-in, as userinit.exe launching scripts from netlogon did here.
  • Detect rundll32.exe calling comsvcs.dll by ordinal, such as #+000024, a form that slips past string-based LSASS dump rules.
  • Review who holds Exchange ApplicationImpersonation and flag Add-MailboxPermission loops that grant FullAccess across the organization.

Our own addition for hunters: because KUKURAT's camouflage deliberately writes to Chrome's registry keys and churns %temp%, look for those writes from processes that are not Chrome, and for software that should not exist living in security-vendor folder names. Unit 42 published indicators for both families in its report.

About the Author

Ava Okello

Ava Okello covers detection engineering, EDR telemetry, and SOC hunting for SOCtember from London.

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