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Huntress six-step flowchart from a Bing search and organic result to the fake watchguard-vpn[.]net site, a credential pop-up, credentials posted twice to watchguard-ssl[.]online, and the genuine signed WatchGuard installer downloading from the official CDN.
Graphic: Huntress, end-to-end flow of the WatchGuard VPN credential phish, from Clean Install, Stolen Creds, Oct 13, 2026 (fair use).

Response

Huntress Says Fake WatchGuard VPN Download Site Asks for Credentials Twice, Then Serves the Genuine Signed Client From WatchGuard's Own CDN

A search-poisoned lookalike, watchguard-vpn[.]net, asked an MSP administrator for VPN server, login and password, rejected the first try to collect a second, and posted both to watchguard-ssl[.]online before downloading WatchGuard's real signed installer, leaving no malware for endpoint tools to catch.

Noah Park, ResponseNew York5 min read

NEW YORK - Huntress said on Oct. 13, 2026 that a search-poisoned lookalike of WatchGuard's VPN download page is collecting VPN server addresses, usernames and passwords from administrators and then handing them the genuine, validly signed WatchGuard client from WatchGuard's own content delivery network, so there is no malicious file for endpoint tools to flag. In a report by James Northey and Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch, the Huntress team says the site, watchguard-vpn[.]net, uses a browser pop-up to ask for the three values the real Mobile VPN with SSL client asks for when it connects, rejects the first attempt as "incorrect," in what Huntress calls a likely attempt to collect a second set, and only then starts a clean download. Huntress describes the design as a twist on an earlier version of the campaign in which attackers swapped in a fake client: this time the fake client is gone from the middle of the chain. For SOC teams, that shifts the evidence away from the endpoint and toward identity and VPN telemetry, because the only thing the victim gives up is a working set of remote-access credentials and the address of the VPN server they unlock.

Search results page with the legitimate WatchGuard Mobile VPN with SSL page labeled in green and the phishing watchguard-vpn.net result labeled in red further down.
Screenshot: Huntress, search results for watchguard vpn sll download showing the legitimate WatchGuard page and the phishing watchguard-vpn.net page, Oct 13, 2026 (fair use).The legitimate WatchGuard page sits above the phishing result for the same search.

The incident Huntress investigated began on Oct. 7, when Huntress Managed Defender flagged activity tied to a user account at a managed service provider. According to the report, an administrator searched Bing for "watchguard vpn sll download" and, eight seconds later, clicked through to www.watchguard-vpn[.]net, a page titled "WatchGuard Firebox VPN Client." The click passed through Bing's standard bing.com/ck/a result redirect with the destination encoded in its u= parameter, which Huntress says supports classifying the lure as SEO poisoning rather than malvertising. The landing page offers a "Download WatchGuard SSL VPN" button and a product question-and-answer section that Huntress believes is there to help its search ranking, and its footer calls it "An independent English-language fan site about WatchGuard Mobile VPN. Not an official sales, download, or support channel." Choosing any download option on the fake "WatchGuard Support Page" at index.php opens a prompt that reads "To install WatchGuard SSL VPN, please enter your connection details" and asks for Server, Login and Password. Huntress notes that the Server field is especially valuable to the attacker because it names the VPN endpoint the stolen credentials open.

Two browser views of watchguard-vpn.net, a download page listing Mobile VPN with SSL 12.11.4 for Windows and macOS, and a pop-up asking for Server, Login and Password.
Screenshot: Huntress, the fake WatchGuard Support Center download page and the credential prompt that opens on Download (fair use).Choosing a download on the fake support page opens a prompt for server, login and password.

The credential theft lives in popup.js, which Huntress describes as about 150 lines of plain, unobfuscated JavaScript. The script wraps whatever the user types in JSON and posts it to a separate collection domain, watchguard-ssl[.]online, with a tag marking whether it is the first or second attempt, and the request sits inside a try/catch block that only logs a console warning if the collector is down, so the victim sees nothing unusual. The first submission is always rejected: the script clears the fields and shows the red message "Incorrect data, please enter again to start installation," which Huntress says pushes users to retype carefully or try a different password. After the second submission the prompt turns green with "VPN client installation has started," and the script clicks a hidden link to WG-MVPN-SSL_12_11_5.exe on cdn.watchguard.com. Huntress says that file is an Inno Setup installer for Mobile VPN with SSL client version 12.11.5, carries an Authenticode signature from WatchGuard Technologies, Inc. issued by Sectigo Public Code Signing CA R36 with a countersignature timestamp of Nov. 4, 2025, and has a recomputed digest that matches its signature, meaning it has not been modified. Earlier this year, the report notes, Microsoft Threat Intelligence tied activity on the sister domain watchguard-vpn[.]com to Storm-2561, a financially motivated actor that used a signed fake MSI to sideload malicious DLLs before pointing victims to the real download. In the Oct. 7 case, browser history showed no download from cdn.watchguard.com, which Huntress reads as a sign the user did not finish both rounds, although credentials may have been entered in the first; Managed Defender flagged the incident 21 seconds after the malicious domain loaded, and the SOC sent the organization remediation steps before the attack could escalate.

Two pop-ups on the fake site, one in red text saying incorrect data and asking the user to enter details again, and one in green saying VPN client installation has started with test values filled in.
Screenshot: Huntress, the forced Incorrect data message after the first submission and the second prompt reporting that installation has started (fair use).The first submission is rejected, and the second is told that installation has started.

The infrastructure has a history that responders can use. WatchGuard's Secplicity team reported watchguard-vpn[.]net in January 2026, when it resolved to 74.208.236[.]39 and had no backend logic; WHOIS now shows the domain was created on Aug. 22, 2026 through Realtime Register B.V., and as of Oct. 9 it resolved to 80.249.132[.]140 on Site BV hosting (LeaseWeb Netherlands, AS60781). The collector, watchguard-ssl[.]online, was registered through Dynadot on Sept. 14, 2026 and resolves to 158.94.209[.]19 (Omegatech LTD, AS202412, Amsterdam). Huntress says the evidence does not establish whether the same operators controlled both registrations of the lure domain. Detection coverage was thin: as of Oct. 8, only seven VirusTotal vendors flagged the lure domain and two flagged the collector, with no AbuseIPDB reports against either IP. The lure domain was offline by Oct. 13, and Huntress says it notified WatchGuard and shared the infrastructure before publishing. Its guidance is response-first: anyone who may have typed credentials into this or a similar site should immediately reset the password for every affected account and treat the associated VPN endpoint as known to the attacker; organizations should enforce multi-factor authentication on top of usernames and passwords, monitor SSL VPN logins from hosting providers, unfamiliar ASNs or countries an account has never connected from, block both domains and both IP addresses, and publish and bookmark official VPN client download links, including software.watchguard.com, in client documentation.

Huntress guidance on password resets, MFA and VPN login monitoring above an indicator table listing watchguard-vpn[.]net, 80.249.132[.]140, watchguard-ssl[.]online, 158.94.209[.]19 and popup.js.
Screenshot: Huntress, Conclusion and Indicators of Compromise sections of the WatchGuard VPN report, Oct 13, 2026 (fair use).Huntress lists the lure domain, the collector, both hosting addresses, and popup.js.

Sources:


Noah Park covers incident response and blue-team operations for SOCtember from New York.

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