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StepSecurity cover graphic for its OPTIMJACK analysis, showing a code tile with a warning sign, an arrow to a wallet holding a payment card with a swap badge, and the labels 1688360[.]cc and cards plus wallets.
Image: StepSecurity (fair use). Cover graphic from the StepSecurity OPTIMJACK analysis, published Nov. 17, 2026.

Response

Optimizely Says an Attacker Abused a Signup Flaw to Act as Customer Admins and Plant a Card Skimmer and Crypto Clipper in Web Experimentation Projects, Reaching Visitors of 178 Organizations

The injected loader ran from Optimizely's own CDN for most of Nov. 16 on sites including CNN, BBC, Zoom, Salesforce and GitLab, and tried to load iPhone exploit kits. Optimizely, which has brought in Mandiant, tells every Web Experimentation customer to treat it as a security incident and check CSP reports, outbound requests and payments from that day.

Noah Park, ResponseNew York7 min read

NEW YORK - An attacker who found a flaw in the account signup flow of Optimizely's Web Experimentation service used it to act as administrators on customer accounts and write malicious JavaScript into their projects on Monday, turning the testing tool's own content delivery network into a channel for a payment card skimmer and a cryptocurrency address swapper, according to an incident report the company sent customers on Tuesday.

The campaign, which researchers have named OPTIMJACK, delivered the code to visitors of at least 178 organizations' websites, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 said. Because the tampered snippets came from cdn.optimizely.com under Optimizely's own certificate, nothing about the delivery looked unusual to the sites or their visitors. Researchers who tracked the payload said affected sites included CNN, the BBC, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, KLM and IKEA.

How the attacker got in

Optimizely said the intruder created accounts through the Web Experimentation signup flow starting at 00:37 UTC on Nov. 16, from addresses that included commercial VPN exits. A flaw in that flow let those accounts act as existing users on customer accounts "through a combination of public information and brute force," the company wrote. Account and project IDs are embedded in every customer's public snippet, and the attacker guessed employee email addresses, repeating the pattern "up to thousands of times" for each targeted customer.

"This was not a credentials breach," the report says. No customer passwords were stolen or used, no Optimizely administrator account was compromised, and customers do not need to reset passwords or regenerate API tokens, the company said.

Acting as those administrators, the attacker edited the Project JavaScript field, custom code that runs on every page carrying the snippet. Where a customer already had custom code there, the attacker's code replaced it.

First page of Optimizely's customer incident report dated Nov. 17, 2026, with an executive summary saying an unauthorized third party exploited a flaw in the Web Experimentation account signup flow to impersonate users and insert malicious JavaScript, that the first code was written at 07:51 UTC and removed by 22:24 UTC, and that sites with a strong Content Security Policy were protected.
Image: Optimizely (fair use).The first page of Optimizely's Security Incident Initial Report for Web Experimentation customers, Nov. 17, 2026.

What ran in visitors' browsers

The script started as soon as it loaded, with no page or URL restrictions, and watched the whole page through a 50-millisecond polling loop, DOM mutation observers and clipboard listeners, Optimizely said. It captured names, card numbers and expiration dates from form submissions, swapped copied wallet addresses for the attacker's own, and on pages where it had swapped an address sent a screenshot and readable cookies to an attacker server. On iPhones and iPads running iOS or iPadOS 18.6 and lower, it loaded a second-stage script from another attacker domain. Unit 42 said that stage attempted to deliver the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits.

Optimizely's timeline has the first malicious code written to a customer project at 07:51 UTC, the activity detected at 13:34, outbound malicious code blocked at Cloudflare at 16:06, the flaw closed at 16:10, impersonated users' sessions ended and tokens revoked at 16:53, and the code removed from every affected project by 22:24. The supplier said the same script was altered several times during the day as the attacker tried to add functionality.

Independent researchers saw a slightly different picture from the outside. Security researcher Scott Helme found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets he checked and dated the first injection to 04:21 UTC, when a BBC snippet began loading code from webshell[.]lol, according to a timeline published by the software supply chain security company StepSecurity. StepSecurity said the payload host 1688360[.]cc was registered at 05:23 UTC that day and placed on hold by its registry at 00:37 UTC on Nov. 17. It also warned that one loader variant hides its URL in base64 and decodes it with atob(), so searching served snippets for the domain string alone will miss it.

Optimizely incident overview table and timeline listing the incident type, affected product, the signup-flow attack vector, the 07:51 to 22:24 UTC exposure window on Nov. 16, 2026, and key milestones from the first impersonated account at 00:37 to removal of all malicious code at 22:24.
Image: Optimizely (fair use).Incident overview and timeline from Optimizely's Nov. 17 customer report.

Who is exposed, and who is not

Optimizely said only Web Experimentation was involved; Feature Experimentation, its SDKs and legacy Full Stack were not affected. The mechanism also bypassed protections on its PCI script host, cdn-pci.optimizely.com, the company said in its answers to customer questions. Sites with a strong Content Security Policy were protected, because the skimmer loaded from an outside domain, and card details typed into hosted payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen were out of its reach. Unless a customer received a notice headed "your site was UNAFFECTED," Optimizely says it should assume it was affected.

The company has engaged Mandiant for an independent investigation and has not named the actor. Its preliminary research says the actor controls pay-cloud[.]online, has run two command-and-control frameworks it calls ADAPTAGENT and CUPCAKE C2 from it since at least September, and uses the same infrastructure for card skimmers in other campaigns.

What responders should do now

Optimizely tells every Web Experimentation customer, affected or not, to treat the episode as a security incident. Its checklist: confirm which pages ran the snippet between 07:51 and 22:24 UTC on Nov. 16, and treat any page with card entry, including CVV, or a cryptocurrency transfer as high risk; review CSP violation reports and outbound browser requests to unfamiliar domains in that window; review card and crypto transactions made on the site; retain web server, CDN, WAF, CSP, payment and fraud monitoring logs covering at least Nov. 16; and take legal advice on notification duties.

Its preliminary indicators are pay-relay.wordpressadmin001.workers[.]dev, the exfiltration endpoint, where any browser request from a customer site "is a strong sign the skimmer ran," and pay-cloud[.]online and pay.pay-cloud[.]online, which hosted the skimmer. StepSecurity adds 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol and three .icu hosts used for the iOS stage, and recommends searching logs back to 04:00 UTC on Nov. 16.

Unit 42's longer-term advice is segmentation: strip nonessential marketing, experimentation and analytics tags from login and checkout pages, and collect payments inside hardened cross-origin iframes. "Any vendor script with dynamic execution privileges on your site is part of your direct production code," wrote Sherrod DeGrippo of Unit 42.

About the Author

Noah Park

Noah Park covers incident response, containment, and blue-team operations for SOCtember from New York.

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