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Sansec chart titled Threat actor switches infra four times, showing Magento stores loading each loader domain from a CMS block: manulfie[.]click from July 2025 on 863 stores, neswnsssn[.]click from December 2025 on 494 stores, lanhd6549tdhse[.]top from late March 2026 on 355 stores, additionalver[.]com from June 2026 on 246 stores and deepveindrilling[.]com from October 2026 on 83 stores, with a dotted line marking the March 30, 2026 PolyShell mass wave.
Chart: Sansec Forensics Team, "deepveindrilling[.]com: Magento CMS block loader hits 953 stores," Oct. 24, 2026 (fair use). Each bar is a loader domain; thin lines show stores that kept loading it after the switch.

Response

Sansec Says a Group That Has Planted Loader Code in 953 Online Stores Since July 2025 Moved to a Fifth Domain and Now Fingerprints Visitors So Security Scanners Get Nothing

The code lives in Magento's cms_block table rather than theme files, and 60 of the 83 stores on the new domain were already victims. A localStorage trick lets a payload rerun on every page view even after the domain is blocked, and one fully patched store got the loader an hour after a clean scan.

Noah Park, ResponseNew York6 min read

NEW YORK - For 15 months the same small piece of code has been turning up inside online stores, mostly Magento shops, and every few months it points somewhere new. The latest address is deepveindrilling[.]com, and it has learned to tell a shopper from a security scanner.

Sansec, the Dutch e-commerce security firm, said on Saturday that the group behind the code has planted it in 953 stores since July 2025, using five loader domains in turn. Sansec found the newest domain in the content management blocks of 83 stores, nearly all on Magento. It was registered on October 6, and the first stores loaded it the next evening. Most were not new victims: 60 of the 83 already ran one of the operator's earlier loaders, 34 of them since October 2025. Sansec says it has tracked the campaign since July 2025 and reported an earlier wave in March as the PolyShell mass attack.

The finding matters for responders because of where the code lives and what it implies. Sansec says a store that loads any of the campaign's domains has given the attacker write access to its database, and deleting the script does not remove that access.

Where the loader hides

The loader sits in Magento's cms_block table, the static blocks the platform renders into storefront pages. Sansec's eComscan found it there on 148 server installs over the course of the campaign, and never in core_config_data or theme files, which is where many teams look first.

Screenshot of Sansec's report section Two loader versions in October, showing the two injected scripts: an inline script that reads a value named fpCode from localStorage and runs it through the onclick attribute of an invisible div, and a script tag loading deepveindrilling[.]com, followed by Sansec's explanation that a visitor who received the payload once runs it again on every later page view.
Screenshot: Sansec Forensics Team, "deepveindrilling[.]com," Oct. 24, 2026 (fair use).The first October loader and Sansec's reading of the localStorage trick.

eComscan first saw the new loader at 21:54 UTC on October 7, and by the end of October 8 Sansec's crawler had found it on 74 stores. The first version came as two scripts. One reads a key called fpCode from the visitor's browser storage and, if it is set, places that code in the onclick attribute of an invisible element and clicks it, so the browser runs it as an event handler without eval(). Nothing in the block writes the key, so the remote script must. The consequence is persistence on the shopper's side: a visitor who received the payload once runs it again on every later page view, even if the domain is offline or blocked. The March version deleted its stored payload after one run.

On October 23 the operator rewrote the blocks again and the loader appeared on 9 more stores. All 71 stores Sansec re-crawled by October 24 run the new version, which sends a browser fingerprint to the server first. It flags automated browsers through navigator.webdriver, Selenium globals and ChromeDriver properties, and adds the WebGL graphics card name, CPU cores, memory, screen size, time zone and languages. When urlscan.io loaded an infected store with automated Chrome, it got a normal page with nothing added. Sansec has not captured the final payload.

What earlier visitors were served

Earlier domains used Keitaro, a commercial ad tracker that doubles as a traffic distribution system and decides per visitor whether to return a payload, a redirect or nothing. On December 12, 2025, a logged-in customer of one infected store got a script that loaded crypto-insider[.]top and, five minutes later, leqdger[.]click, a misspelling of the Ledger wallet brand. When Sansec requested the additionalver[.]com script as a Windows desktop visitor on October 24, the server returned a statement that does nothing and set a cookie marking the visitor for 24 hours. Sansec's CSP monitoring service received reports of visitors' browsers loading all four earlier domains, including about 52,000 for additionalver[.]com.

Screenshot of Sansec's table of five loader domains with registration dates, first-seen dates and store counts: manulfie[.]click, first seen 2025-07-09, 863 stores; neswnsssn[.]click, 2025-12-12, 494 stores; lanhd6549tdhse[.]top, registered 2026-03-25, 355 stores; additionalver[.]com, registered 2026-06-07, 246 stores; deepveindrilling[.]com, registered 2026-10-06, 83 stores.
Screenshot: Sansec Forensics Team, "deepveindrilling[.]com," Five domains in 15 months, Oct. 24, 2026 (fair use).Two old domains have since been re-registered by a new owner.

Two of the old domains, manulfie[.]click and neswnsssn[.]click, expired and were registered again in May 2026, and now sit on a parking service's nameservers. Between August and October, Sansec still found the first on 9 stores and the second on 6. Visitors to those stores send their referrer and page title to whoever owns the domains now, and their browsers run any script it returns.

How the stores were breached

The October rewrites needed no new flaw because the operator already had access. Earlier waves point to Magento file upload bugs. In March the operator injected the loader into 471 stores in one hour after uploading webshells through PolyShell, CVE-2026-48356. Across the campaign eComscan found the loader on 169 Magento 2 installs missing at least one core patch, and 102 of them, 60 percent, also had files uploaded through PolyShell or SessionReaper, CVE-2025-54236. On 3,024 comparable installs with a different skimmer, the rate was 32 percent.

Patching alone did not save one victim. A store on Magento 2.4.7-p10, with no missing core patches, got the new loader at 16:46 UTC on October 23, one hour after a clean scan. eComscan had found a rogue admin account on it on September 16 and a GSocket backdoor on September 24.

Screenshot of Sansec's How to check your store section, showing a SQL query that selects block_id, identifier and update_time from cms_block where content contains fpCode, se_referrer or localStorage.getItem, advice to run the same query on cms_page, and find commands for unexpected files in pub/media/custom_options and pub/media/customer_address and for files named accesson.php.
Screenshot: Sansec Forensics Team, "deepveindrilling[.]com," How to check your store, Oct. 24, 2026 (fair use).The queries Sansec publishes for store owners.

What responders can do now

  • Query cms_block and cms_page for content containing fpCode, se_referrer or localStorage.getItem, since the domains are often base64 encoded. The update_time column shows the attacker's most recent write.
  • Treat a hit as a database compromise, not a defacement. Look for files in pub/media/custom_options/ and pub/media/customer_address/ other than .htaccess, files named accesson.php, accounts in admin_user you do not recognize and unfamiliar processes such as a GSocket backdoor.
  • After cleanup, change the database, admin and API integration passwords, and install APSB26-73 for PolyShell and APSB25-88 for SessionReaper.
  • Add the campaign domains to CSP monitoring and egress blocks: deepveindrilling[.]com, additionalver[.]com, lanhd6549tdhse[.]top, neswnsssn[.]click, manulfie[.]click, hdfdsi84j3h[.]top, c85grt98sd[.]com, leqdger[.]click and crypto-insider[.]top. The localStorage keys fpCode, 136c1e07507f4a97 and 136c1e07507f4a98 mark affected browsers.
  • Do not trust a clean automated crawl. The current loader is built to return nothing to headless browsers, so check the database rather than the rendered page.

Sources:


Noah Park covers incident response and blue-team operations for SOCtember from New York.

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