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Blackpoint Cyber title graphic reading CNCMachineRMS: Inside the ROMULUS Campaign, the missing piece behind a ClickFix RAT, beside a code panel labeled I++u.dll loader showing a ReadEmbeddedPayload routine that reads Build.dat, XOR-decrypts the payload and calls VirtualAlloc and EnumSystemCodePagesW, marked RAT recovered.
Image: Blackpoint Cyber (fair use). Blackpoint's graphic for its CNCMachineRMS research.

Threat Intel

Blackpoint Says the Unnamed RAT in the ROMULUS ClickFix Campaign Is CNCMachineRMS, Traced Through a Tampered Stardock Library and Shellcode Hidden in a Fake NuGet Package

Researchers at Blackpoint Cyber recovered the final implant from a malicious Stardock installer and matched its storage format, scripting resource and internal strings to a remote access trojan LevelBlue documented in August. The finding links two ClickFix delivery chains that had been tracked separately.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelSingapore5 min read

SINGAPORE - The remote access trojan at the end of a ClickFix campaign that abused ChatGPT custom GPTs and signed copies of legitimate Windows software has a name, researchers at the managed detection firm Blackpoint Cyber said this week: CNCMachineRMS, a RAT that LevelBlue SpiderLabs first documented in August as the final payload of an unrelated infection chain.

Blackpoint's Adversary Pursuit Group said in a report published Nov. 18 that it assesses "with high confidence" that the unnamed RAT delivered through ROMULUS, a ClickFix delivery service Forescout's Vedere Labs described in October, is CNCMachineRMS. The researchers, Sam Decker, Nevan Beal and Andi Ursry, said ROMULUS distributes CNCMachineRMS and a second family, LegionLoader, through separate chains. They cautioned that the findings show shared tooling but "do not establish a shared or connected operator."

The campaign has been building in public for two months. Huntress reported on Sept. 28 that attackers were abusing ChatGPT custom GPTs to distribute malicious installers that ended in an unidentified RAT, loaded through DLL side-loading, concealed shellcode and encrypted storage. Forescout tied infrastructure from the Stardock-themed chain to ROMULUS on Oct. 15. Neither named the final implant, and Blackpoint said it had observed variations of the chain abusing applications from Canon and Stardock.

Screenshot of the Key Takeaways section of Blackpoint Cyber's report, listing that its Adversary Pursuit Group identified the previously unnamed RAT delivered through ROMULUS as CNCMachineRMS, that ROMULUS distributed both CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader, and that the RAT was recovered from a malicious Stardock installer.
Image: Blackpoint Cyber (fair use).The key findings of Blackpoint's report.

From a fake prompt to a signed process

The chain Blackpoint examined starts with an obfuscated PowerShell stager that downloads an installer named IconEdit2Turb.msi, strips its Mark of the Web and runs it silently through msiexec.exe. The download infrastructure used decimal IP notation, a trick the researchers said they have seen across other ClickFix campaigns.

The MSI poses as Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool and installs under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool\, setting ARPSYSTEMCOMPONENT=1 so it does not appear in installed-program lists. It then launches DeElevate64.exe, a legitimate signed Stardock executable. Rather than touch the signed binary, the attackers modified its companion library, DeElevator64.dll, to import a malicious DLL named I++u.dll, so the malicious code runs inside the trusted Stardock process.

Screenshot from Blackpoint Cyber's report showing a disassembler's program tree and symbol tree for DeElevator64.dll, with the imports list including ADVAPI32.DLL, I++U.DLL highlighted in a red box, and KERNEL32.DLL.
Image: Blackpoint Cyber (fair use).The modified DeElevator64.dll importing the malicious I++u.dll, Blackpoint's Figure 2.

I++u.dll reads an encrypted payload from a file called Build.dat, which looks like a legitimate Microsoft System.Net.Http NuGet package. Blackpoint said the shellcode was concealed inside the compressed data of an existing package entry rather than stored as a separate file. After reversing a position-dependent XOR routine, the researchers recovered about 341 KB of x64 shellcode, which the loader runs in memory by passing its address to the Windows EnumSystemCodePagesW callback after allocating executable memory through VirtualAlloc.

The match

That shellcode opens a proprietary storage file, execute_engine_disconnect.raw, which Blackpoint decoded without running the malware. It held 1,128 entries, 315 directories and 813 files. A resource of class 16001 contained a 3,904-byte controller script, and class 16100 held about 1.58 MB of shellcode that is the RAT itself. The researchers said the RAT's SHA-256 matched the final implant Huntress documented.

The attribution rests on that structure. Blackpoint said the archive's header and record layout, the arithmetic used to decode its metadata, the 1,128 record count and the 3,904-byte class 16001 script all match the sample LevelBlue analyzed in August, which was side-loaded through IBM SPSS's WinWrapIDE.exe at the end of a BabaDeda chain. The RAT also builds the strings CNCMachineRMS\tasks and task_payload.bin at runtime, matching the task staging LevelBlue described.

Screenshot from Blackpoint Cyber's report showing a reconstructed C string decoding routine named DecodeTaskDirectory with an array of encoded values and a loop that decodes them into the CNCMachineRMS task directory path.
Image: Blackpoint Cyber (fair use).The string decoding routine that reveals the CNCMachineRMS task directory, Blackpoint's Figure 7.

Huntress's earlier analysis of the same implant documented remote desktop control, screen streaming, microphone and camera capture, file management, reconnaissance and the ability to run further payloads. Blackpoint said the RAT resolves its command server through DNS over HTTPS, and that its controller script re-creates a Registry Run entry every 150 seconds and a scheduled task every 875 seconds, both named Stardock DeElevation Tool, with a shutdown monitor that restores the Registry entry.

What to hunt

The persistence pair is the most direct hook: a Run value and a scheduled task with the same Stardock name that come back after removal. Blackpoint's report also lists file hashes for five malicious installers (ISOSimple.msi, IconEdit2Turb.msi, FilesInspectorX.msi, ClipboardFusion.msi and AllMyBasic.msi), the modified DeElevator64.dll, I++u.dll and Build.dat, the installation directory, and nine ROMULUS command server IP addresses plus the lookalike domains cloubflare[.]top and cloubflare[.]net.

The researchers recommended watching for PowerShell that downloads installers followed by silent MSI execution, signed applications running from user profile directories and loading unsigned or modified DLLs, and DNS over HTTPS from processes that have no reason to use it. Because the delivery wrappers keep changing, they wrote, "the underlying malware architecture provides a more consistent way to identify related activity."

About the Author

Priya Shah

Priya Shah covers threat intelligence, intrusion analysis, and adversary tradecraft for SOCtember from Singapore.

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