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GreyNoise title graphic reading Proxyjacking Edge Devices Into Residential Proxies on a dark field with the GreyNoise wordmark.
Graphic: GreyNoise, article title art for Proxyjacking Edge Devices Into Residential Proxies, Oct 15, 2026 (fair use).

Threat Intel

GreyNoise Says skynox7 Forced 143 Edge Devices Across 34 Countries Into Pawns.app Residential Proxies and Planted SSH Keys for Backup Access

GreyNoise tied a product-demo Entra ID case to residential proxies that hid a serious intrusion, then documented a separate actor that exploits D-Link NAS, UniFi Video Log4Shell and SAP NetWeaver flaws to install Pawns.app proxyware and, on some hosts, attacker SSH keys.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelNew York5 min read

NEW YORK - GreyNoise said on Oct. 15, 2026 that a financially motivated actor it tracks as skynox7 is forcing internet-exposed network edge devices into the Pawns.app residential proxy network, monetizing victim bandwidth without consent. In the same report, GreyNoise describes a separate enterprise intrusion that surfaced during a live product demonstration: Entra ID sign-in logs showed GreyNoise-labeled malicious IP addresses that looked residential and sat in geolocations that made sense for the organization's users. Multiple users later authenticated from one of those same residential proxy addresses, a pattern GreyNoise says is vanishingly unlikely to be legitimate, and the organization confirmed a serious intrusion. GreyNoise did not publish the intrusion case details, but used the finding as the starting point for research into commercial residential proxy abuse. For SOC teams, the lesson is that residential proxy exits break geolocation and impossible-travel assumptions that many identity detections still lean on.

GreyNoise diagram with a teal intended-use row for Pawns.app and IPRoyal above a magenta attacker row for recon, exploit, install and enroll of edge devices.
Graphic: GreyNoise, proxyjacking diagram comparing intended Pawns.app bandwidth sharing with the attacker path, Oct 2026 (fair use).The diagram contrasts intended Pawns.app sharing with the attacker's path.

Proxyware such as Pawns.app lets volunteers install an agent and earn money by selling spare bandwidth into a residential proxy pool. GreyNoise notes that Pawns.app is a direct partner of IPRoyal and supplies nodes that IPRoyal resells for legitimate uses. The command-line builds accept a username, password and device name at runtime, which makes them easy to install on hardware the operator does not own. Proxyjacking is the criminal version of that model: an attacker compromises devices and enrolls them under attacker-controlled credentials so the payout flows to the attacker while the victim's ISP connection and public IP become exit nodes for whoever rents the proxy.

Four-step intended path where an owner opts in, joins the Pawns.app network, feeds IPRoyal, and serves proxy customers.
Graphic: GreyNoise, intended Pawns.app and IPRoyal bandwidth-sharing model (fair use).The intended model starts with an owner who opts in on a device they control.

GreyNoise says skynox7 compromised at least 143 devices in 34 countries. The exploits it ties to the campaign include D-Link ShareCenter NAS flaws CVE-2024-3272 and CVE-2024-3273, Log4Shell against Ubiquiti UniFi Video NVR tracked as CVE-2021-44228, and SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer CVE-2025-31324. The actor also appeared to target Hikvision and Dahua digital video recorders and network video recorders. GreyNoise's published diagram of the campaign shows reconnaissance against roughly 118,000 home routers, NAS boxes and video recorders, installation of the official Pawns.app client renamed gotoschool with restart-on-reboot persistence, and enrollment that moved about 281.84 GB of traffic for a reported payout of $56.62. Consent is the difference GreyNoise highlights: the attacker's script accepts Pawns.app's terms on the victim's behalf, even though those terms require the app to run only on devices the user lawfully controls.

Attacker path showing recon of about 118,000 edge devices, exploit of D-Link and UniFi flaws, install of a Pawns.app client renamed gotoschool, and enrollment of 143 devices in 34 countries.
Graphic: GreyNoise, skynox7 attacker path from recon through Pawns.app enrollment and payout (fair use).The attacker path runs from recon through a renamed Pawns.app client to a payout.

On some hosts the actor also planted a backup access method. A Java exploit snippet GreyNoise published as Exploit2 creates .ssh directories for root and the Ubiquiti default user ubnt, appends an attacker SSH public key to authorized_keys, downloads a CLI binary to /tmp/gs with curl, runs it with attacker email, password and device-name flags plus -accept-tos, then callbacks when the install finishes. Redactions in that screenshot are GreyNoise's. Separately, GreyNoise publishes seven SHA-256 hashes for Pawns.app binaries observed in the campaign, the staging and exploitation host 209.99.190.80, and the Pawns payout account skynox7@proton.me. GreyNoise notes the binaries are not malware by themselves unless installed without consent.

Exploit2 Java snippet that appends an attacker SSH key for root and ubnt, downloads a CLI binary to /tmp/gs with -accept-tos, then callbacks; redactions by GreyNoise.
Screenshot: GreyNoise, Java Exploit2 payload planting SSH keys and installing a Pawns.app CLI client (fair use).Exploit2 plants an SSH key, then downloads a CLI client and accepts the terms.

Defenders can hunt both sides of the problem. On the edge, look for unexpected Pawns.app or renamed agents such as gotoschool, unknown SSH keys in authorized_keys on NAS and NVR appliances, and outbound contact to 209.99.190.80 or the published hashes. On the identity side, GreyNoise recommends treating residential proxy labels in authentication logs as a signal worth scrutiny, especially when several enterprise users share one residential proxy IP, and pairing that with mismatches in device identifiers, session identifiers or User-Agent strings rather than relying on geolocation alone. GreyNoise also points organizations to its free check-my-IP service against the Global Observation Grid as one way to see whether an address has interacted with its sensors. The report is not a CISA advisory; it is vendor sensor and research work aimed at the residential-proxy blind spot in modern SOC identity monitoring.

Sources:


Priya Shah covers threat intelligence and adversary infrastructure for SOCtember from New York.

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