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Dark Discord embed titled Device Registered listing device ID, hostname, registration time, private and public IP, online status, uptime and a dedicated channel mention.
Screenshot: Darktrace, Discord Device Registered embed for a CikaBika Bot victim channel, from CikaBika Bot: Inside a Discord RAT, Oct 14, 2026 (fair use).

Threat Intel

Darktrace Says CikaBika Bot Registers Each Victim on Discord for C2 After a Nim Loader Plants dbghelp.dll in Microsoft Edge

A document-themed disk image drops a decoy PDF and a Word-lookalike LNK that XOR-decodes a Nim loader; the loader stages a Rust RAT as dbghelp.dll under Microsoft Edge, then the bot registers the host on Discord, takes screenshots and, in observed activity, zips folders for ngrok exfiltration.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelSingapore5 min read

SINGAPORE - Darktrace said on Oct. 14, 2026 that researchers have tracked an ongoing campaign delivering CikaBika Bot, a Rust-based remote access trojan that registers each compromised host on Discord, accepts operator commands through a dedicated channel, and, in observed activity, compresses folders and sends them out through ngrok. In a report by Tara Gould, Darktrace's malware research lead, the infection chain starts with a disk image that holds a decoy PDF and a Windows shortcut dressed as a Word document, continues through a Nim loader that plants a malicious dbghelp.dll under Microsoft Edge, and ends with Discord as the command-and-control plane so the operator does not need a dedicated C2 server. For SOC teams, the huntable surface is the document-themed lure, the Edge-directory DLL plant, Discord API traffic from a non-Discord process, and outbound archives to ngrok endpoints.

Dark code view of a PowerShell one-liner that opens Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf, XOR-decodes bytes into %TEMP%\IfyuUapz.txt and runs it with cmd /c.
Screenshot: Darktrace, PowerShell command embedded in the malicious shortcut that XOR-decodes a payload from the decoy PDF (fair use).The shortcut's PowerShell reads the decoy PDF, XOR-decodes a payload, and runs it from temp.

According to Darktrace, the package is a disk image named Proposition_Projet.img that contains Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf and a shortcut named Proposition_Projet_Personnalisable.docx. Delivery is unconfirmed, but the French document-themed filenames and lure style are consistent with phishing. Opening the shortcut launches a hidden PowerShell process while the PDF opens as a decoy explaining how to summarize a text. That PowerShell reads the PDF as bytes, uses the value at offset 239 as an XOR key, writes the decoded executable to %TEMP%\IfyuUapz.txt, and runs it with cmd /c.

PowerShell script setting SourceDll and TargetDir under Program Files (x86) Microsoft Edge Application, copying dbghelp.dll and embedding a C# WindowHider helper.
Screenshot: Darktrace, Silent DLL Deployer for Edge PowerShell that plants dbghelp.dll under Microsoft Edge (fair use).A silent deployer copies dbghelp.dll toward the Microsoft Edge Application directory.

IfyuUapz.txt is a Nim-based loader that carries two Base64 blobs: a Rust DLL and a PowerShell deployment script. The loader writes both to temporary files, runs the script through a hidden encoded PowerShell command, then tries to load the DLL with Nim's loadLib and, on failure, retries through regsvr32.exe. The script's job is to move the DLL to C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\dbghelp.dll. It first copies the DLL to C:\Windows\Temp\dbghelp.tmp, then modifies HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command so that launching computerdefaults.exe can move the staged file into the protected Edge directory, an attempt to bypass User Account Control that depends on the target's Windows configuration. A small C# helper hides Windows Settings and ApplicationFrameHost windows; the script launches that helper three times, checks for the destination DLL, and tries to delete temporary scripts, the intermediate DLL and the registry changes. Legitimate msedge.exe delay-loads dbghelp.dll, and the malicious DLL exports a subset of Microsoft debugging-library functions, which Darktrace reads as an intended DLL search-order hijack even though incomplete exports mean Edge may not always load it successfully.

Darktrace capture of a Discord status line listing !shell !src !info !download and related commands above a Network Configuration message that attaches network_info.txt via cdn.discordapp.com.
Screenshot: Darktrace, available Discord RAT commands and a Network Configuration message attaching network_info.txt (fair use).The bot lists shell, download and stream commands, then posts a network-info attachment.

Once running, the Rust RAT registers the device with Discord and starts reconnaissance: system details, tasklist, ipconfig, and a screenshot, producing artifacts such as tasklist_startup.txt, network_info.txt and screenshot.png. Registration traffic uses ipify.com for the public IP and records device ID, hostname, registration time, private and public addresses, status, uptime and the Discord channel assigned to that host. Operators issue commands in that channel, including !shell, !sysinfo, !info, !isOn, !tasklist, !ps, !kill, !upload, !download, and handlers referencing screenshots (!src), camera (!camera), streaming (!stream) and broadcasting (!broadcast). In observed activity, the operator compressed a directory into a ZIP and exfiltrated it through ngrok, and separately used !download to pull a named document from the victim desktop back through the Discord channel.

Discord message from sousou.ps1 showing Compress-Archive on a user path and curl POST to an ngrok-free.app upload URL with a zip filename.
Screenshot: Darktrace, Discord-channel PowerShell that zips a user folder and curls it to an ngrok upload endpoint (fair use).An operator command zips a user folder and posts it to an ngrok upload URL.

Darktrace published MD5 indicators for Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf (eeb52cb95113a131c2c7713c17872da6), the LNK (62e3e85eca78a0cd7e6669e9f33d936d), dbghelp.dll (c66858718d883bcfb9ce2c19b59f96c9) and IfyuUapz.txt (2deb724a709b0b892248405323350e9b), and mapped the chain to ATT&CK techniques covering user execution, PowerShell, UAC bypass, DLL search-order hijacking, Discord web-service C2 and exfiltration over web services. Defenders should watch for LNK and IMG lures that spawn hidden PowerShell reading a PDF, dbghelp.dll written under the Edge Application directory, ms-settings shell open command tampering, Discord API calls from non-Discord processes, and Compress-Archive followed by curl POSTs to ngrok-free.app or similar tunnels.

Sources:


Priya Shah covers threat intelligence, intrusion analysis, and adversary tradecraft for SOCtember from Singapore.

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