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Kaspersky Securelist header art for its AuditTeam research: a dark umbrella held open against a burst of orange flame and blue-green smoke.
Image: Kaspersky (fair use). Header image from the Securelist post on AuditTeam and OpsAgent, published Nov. 18, 2026.

Threat Intel

Kaspersky Says AuditTeam Bills Its Ransomware Victims an "Audit & Consulting Fee," and Arrives With a Cobalt Strike-Class Implant and a Signed Antivirus Driver That Kills About 220 Security and Logging Processes

The OpsAgent framework, rewritten from C++ to Rust this year, finds its command servers through a public GitHub page and hides them behind Amazon CloudFront. Kaspersky counted dozens of infected organizations in seven countries and territories since January, and the ransom note arrives only after files are already encrypted.

Priya Shah, Threat IntelSingapore6 min read

SINGAPORE - A ransomware crew that calls itself AuditTeam has spent most of 2026 breaking into organizations with a custom framework built to look like a penetration testing tool, then leaving a note that dresses up extortion as a bill for security consulting, Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team said Wednesday.

The note demands an "Audit & Consulting fee" in exchange for a report on the vulnerabilities the attackers used and threatens to publish stolen data if the victim refuses. It does not mention encryption, but it is dropped by the group's cryptor module, so "if a victim sees the note, their files are already encrypted," wrote Kaspersky researcher Vladimir Nestor.

Kaspersky said the campaign began on Jan. 5, 2026, according to commit history on a GitHub repository the group used, and ran at least through October. It infected dozens of organizations in Russia, Italy, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Senegal, Finland and China, and the group's leak site claims victims in seven more countries: Turkey, Thailand, Ukraine, Argentina, South Korea, Japan and Spain. The victims span different industries. The company presented the findings at its CyberSecurity Weekend conference in Tashkent.

AuditTeam ransom note formatted as an audit log, headed Severe Infrastructure Compromise Verified, offering Option A to pay the Audit and Consulting fee for a vulnerability report and data purge, or Option B public release of the data, with Tor Browser instructions and an onion address.
Image: Kaspersky (fair use).The AuditTeam ransom note, as published by Kaspersky GReAT.

An implant built like a commercial red team tool

Kaspersky first saw OpsAgent on March 10 against an organization in Hong Kong. Version 5.2.8 of the implant "rivals Cobalt Strike in functionality," the researchers wrote: file and process management, shellcode injection, token theft, a getsystem command, keylogging, screenshots, and lateral movement through child agents linked over SMB, HTTP or TCP, with SOCKS proxying over a TLS WebSocket channel.

Commands such as mimikatz_spawn, execute_assembly, pth_spawn and runpe start a separate process, by default msiexec.exe, open a named pipe and receive XOR-encrypted shellcode from the server, so no credential tool is embedded in the implant itself. Loaders found in April, June and September injected into msiexec.exe through CreateRemoteThread or NtQueueApcThread, or, in the newest Rust loader, ran the payload inside their own process. Kaspersky said repetitive code patterns suggest the framework was written with help from a large language model.

The Rust rewrite, OpsAgent-rs, starts with HTTP POST polling and upgrades to a persistent WebSocket on command, adds interactive shells and drops the older pivoting commands.

Command servers found through GitHub

OpsAgent can read its server address from a public GitHub page, github[.]com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPage, where it is stored AES-encrypted between GetConfig and EndConfig markers. The servers themselves are AWS-generated CloudFront subdomains, d19v1tntmz2i98[.]cloudfront[.]net and d35htktbyt7nxc[.]cloudfront[.]net, plus the address 157.20.104[.]111. Because CloudFront address space is shared with legitimate traffic, Kaspersky warned, IP blocking is impractical. The repository was removed in November, but the latest Rust implants had the GitHub lookup switched off, so its removal does not mean the campaign is over.

Kaspersky timeline of AuditTeam activity: first GitHub commit with C2 on Jan. 5, 2026, first known leak-site victim Feb. 21, first public mention by dbdigest.com in March, commit with C2 for OpsAgent-rs Aug. 19, OpsAgent-rs deployed in attacks in August, and legacy C2 domain removed Sept. 29.
Image: Kaspersky (fair use).AuditTeam activity timeline from the Securelist post.

Blinding the SOC before encryption

The group's antivirus and EDR killer installs a validly signed driver posing as Beijing Jiangmin Antivirus, kvcore.sys, and talks to it through the \KvCorePortX0 filter port. Its kill list has about 220 entries, and it reaches past endpoint agents: Kaspersky listed Microsoft Defender, Sysmon, splunkd and wazuh-agent alongside TeamViewer, Veeam and Acronis services and database engines.

The cryptor then stops SQL Server, Oracle, MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB and Redis, along with backup services, deletes shadow copies, empties the recycle bin and wipes temporary folders, overwriting deleted files with random data so they cannot be recovered. It encrypts with AES-CBC or ChaCha20 and wraps per-file keys with an X25519 exchange.

What to hunt for

In our reading, the most useful early signal for a SOC may be the loss of telemetry itself: a Sysmon, Splunk forwarder or Wazuh agent that goes silent on several hosts at once is worth an incident, not a ticket. Kaspersky's published file paths include syscache.dat under ProgramData and user AppData caches, C:\Users\Public\kv_dbg.log and kvcore.sys in the system drivers folder, and it lists stager hashes such as d3e49dceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857 and the driver hash 109cdc24ccd4872a3e4bf6f2d4f3c3d4. Other tells include msiexec.exe or notepad.exe receiving injected code over a named pipe, and endpoints fetching a GitHub page and then holding long WebSocket sessions to CloudFront hosts.

Kaspersky's broader point is that custom multi-module implants are usually the work of state-backed teams with engineering staff. "AuditTeam shows that a ransomware crew can build comparable tooling," the report says, adding that AI-assisted development may be lowering that barrier.

About the Author

Priya Shah

Priya Shah covers threat intelligence, intrusion analysis, and adversary tradecraft for SOCtember from Singapore.

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