Skip to content

Response, New York. Noah Park: Check Point Patches Actively Exploited Management Server Path Traversal. Detection, Dallas. Ava Okello: Report Finds Nearly Half of Deployed Detections Need Attention Before SOCs Can Trust Them.

SOCtember

Always First. Fast SOC News.

Huntress header art for its MDM abuse research: a laptop showing an MDM console with enrolled devices, one marked At Risk, and the red outline of a figure looming behind the screen.
Image: Huntress (fair use). Header art from Huntress's post Managed for Malice, published Oct. 28, 2026.

Tools

Huntress Says Attackers Are Phishing Users Into Enrolling Their PCs in Attacker-Run Hexnode and Rippling MDM Tenants, Then Pushing ScreenConnect That Comes Back After It Is Removed

In one case a fake DocuSign installer carried the Hexnode agent; in another a lookalike Teams calendar page enrolled a receptionist's machine in Rippling, and the MDM installed ScreenConnect as SYSTEM about 35 minutes later. Huntress says neither vendor is at fault and that MDM enrollment should be treated as a security event.

James Whitford, ToolsAustin5 min read

AUSTIN - Attackers are tricking employees into enrolling their computers in mobile device management tenants that the attackers control, then using the MDM's trusted access to install remote access tools, according to research published this week by the managed security company Huntress. In the cases it described, the tools were legitimate products from Hexnode and Rippling, and the payload they delivered was ScreenConnect.

"Neither Hexnode nor Rippling are at fault here," wrote Ben Nahorney, the author of the Huntress post, adding that "users are simply being socially engineered into installing their software." Huntress said it has observed several recent incidents of this kind and that its examples are not a definitive list of the MDM products that could be abused.

The problem for defenders is persistence. An MDM enrollment gives an attacker a privileged management path that sits beneath any single remote access tool, so removing the visible RMM agent does not remove the channel that installed it.

Huntress Key Takeaways box: attackers are abusing legitimate MDM platforms like Hexnode and Rippling through social engineering; once established, MDM provides a trusted, privileged path for deploying rogue RMM tools and maintaining remote access; defenders should monitor unexpected MDM enrollments, management agents, RMM services and external relay connections.
Image: Huntress (fair use).Key takeaways from the Huntress post, captured Oct. 30, 2026.

The ScreenConnect that kept coming back

In the first incident, Huntress raised an alert for an unauthorized ScreenConnect installation, and the managed service provider removed it. Several hours later another instance appeared on the same computer and connected to the same relay. That second alert led Huntress to isolate the endpoint.

The attack had begun with phishing emails using proposal-related subjects such as "ATTN: Official Invitation to Submit Proposal" and "Review Required," which mentioned an organization the target likely did business with. A link downloaded a file named eD0cuSign_Installer.msi into the Microsoft Edge temporary downloads folder. Although it was named to look like a DocuSign installer, the package contained Hexnode MDM components, including Hexnode Gateway, the Hexnode agent and supporting PostgreSQL components, all of which were installed.

Huntress process tree showing winlogon.exe, userinit.exe, explorer.exe and msedge.exe leading to msiexec.exe installing eD0cuSign_Installer.msi from the Microsoft Edge downloads folder, with process and file details including the command line, a Microsoft Corporation signature and file hashes.
Image: Huntress (fair use).Figure 1, execution of the Hexnode MSI disguised as a DocuSign installer.

The attacker then installed ScreenConnect, which connected to relay.bobdthjau[.]com on port 8041. After the provider removed it, the attacker used the still-enrolled MDM to stage and install it again.

Enrollment from a link

The second case required no installer at all. A receptionist opened an email titled "Re: Tax Planning and Preparation Inquiry" that linked to what looked like a Microsoft Teams meeting invitation. The link led to a page titled "Calendar" on a lookalike Teams domain under kiratham[.]com, which redirected to a PHP file that appears to have facilitated enrollment in an attacker-controlled Rippling tenant.

About a minute after the click, a Rippling enrollment registry key appeared on the machine. An installer for the Rippling agent was downloaded and the agent was installed with SYSTEM-level permissions as C:\Rippling\daemon.exe. Huntress said the activity originated from the online Rippling management agent, suggesting the attacker had created an account in advance. Approximately 35 minutes after installation, the attacker used the MDM to stage and run a ScreenConnect installer as SYSTEM, connecting to relay.pronconetydesire[.]online on port 8041.

Treat enrollment as a security event

Huntress compares the trend to the long-running abuse of legitimate RMM tools: reputation alone no longer establishes intent. "MDM enrollment should be treated as security-sensitive activity as opposed to a routine administrative task," the researchers wrote. They argue that an unexpected enrollment can establish persistence and a privileged deployment path without any conspicuous malware.

For detection, Huntress says the stronger signal is the sequence rather than any single event: social engineering, then a new MDM enrollment, then an RMM installation, then outbound traffic to an unfamiliar relay. Because the chain varies, it recommends correlating identity, MDM, endpoint and network telemetry.

For a SOC or IT operations team, our reading is that the most useful control is an allowlist. Huntress recommends that organizations:

  • Keep an inventory of authorized MDM products, tenants, agents and RMM instances, and treat any unexpected enrollment, management agent or RMM instance as a security event.
  • Train users to verify unexpected meeting, document-signing and proposal-review requests, and scrutinize business-themed lures in email and web controls.
  • If a compromise is suspected, isolate the endpoint, remove it from the unauthorized MDM tenant, disable attacker-created accounts, revoke active sessions or tokens, reset affected credentials and reimage the endpoint if its integrity cannot be confirmed.
Huntress table of indicators of compromise, including the delivery URL on webdocusign.viewportal[.]es, the eD0cuSign_Installer.msi file, the ScreenConnect relays relay.bobdthjau[.]com:8041 and relay.pronconetydesire[.]online:8041, and the lookalike Teams URLs used for Rippling enrollment.
Image: Huntress (fair use).Indicators of compromise from the Huntress post, captured Oct. 30, 2026.

Huntress published the indicators from both cases: the delivery URL hxxps://webdocusign.viewportal[.]es/Windows/download/index.php, the file eD0cuSign_Installer.msi, the relays relay.bobdthjau[.]com:8041 and relay.pronconetydesire[.]online:8041, and the lookalike Teams URLs on teams-microsoftcom5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592.kiratham[.]com, including the enrollment page /teams/14/enroll14.php.

About the Author

James Whitford

James Whitford covers SOC tooling, SIEM, SOAR, and detection platforms for SOCtember from Austin.

Related stories

Tools desk