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Censys illustration of browser windows labeled CNN, Zoom and BBC with injected code feeding a payment card, a cryptocurrency coin and an iPhone exploit panel, all linked to the channel code 02111110.
Image: Censys (fair use). Header illustration from the Censys ARC analysis of the MCH and Caishen infrastructure, published Nov. 17, 2026.

Detection

Censys Traces the Optimizely Skimmer to a Rented Loader and an Off-the-Shelf iPhone Exploit Kit Whose Control Panel Appears on 142 Websites, and Says the Operator Was Back on Five New Hosts Within a Day

The researchers sinkholed the campaign's domains, rebuilt its timeline from scan, certificate and blockchain records, and found the code tag tying its parts together is the kit's factory default. They published page-title queries and code markers that let defenders find the same kit elsewhere.

Ava Okello, DetectionLondon6 min read

LONDON - The poisoned scripts that served a card skimmer and a cryptocurrency clipper to visitors of the BBC, Zoom, CNN and other major sites on Monday ran on rented and reused criminal infrastructure rather than tooling built for the job, according to an analysis by the internet scanning company Censys, which says the operator rebuilt within about a day of disclosure.

Censys researchers Aidan Holland, Andrew Northern and Silas Cutler linked the campaign, which other researchers have named OPTIMJACK, to a control panel titled MCH, an iPhone exploit backend branded Caishen and a set of cryptocurrency "energy rental" storefronts. As of Tuesday, Censys counted the panel title on 142 web properties, the Caishen backend title on 144 and the storefront title on 55, across unrelated hosting providers and registrants. A shared panel version string, mch-v5-5.7.0-prod, points to one release deployed by many operators, Censys said; the November campaign accounts for three hosts and their domains.

What visitors received

Censys sinkholed the campaign's newly registered domains starting on Nov. 16, and referrers to its sinkhole confirmed affected sites including the BBC, Zoom, CNN, DoorDash, Zillow, Fox News and GitLab. On zoom.com, a Censys capture showed an Optimizely project script on cdn.optimizely.com loading a 29 KB file called track.js from the domain 1688360[.]cc. Censys's scans found the same track.js on at least 30 sites on Nov. 16, and the company said reporting and its own data tie the same loader route to other third-party libraries, including Kissmetrics on Nov. 13, StorifyMe and minute-ly.

Censys diagram of the injection path on zoom.com captured Nov. 16 at 21:14 UTC: the page loads an Optimizely project script from cdn.optimizely.com, which requests track.js from 1688360[.]cc, a 29,882-byte file served from 136.113.106[.]136.
Image: Censys (fair use).The injection path on zoom.com, from the Censys analysis.

The script hooked form submissions on every page, validated anything resembling a card number with a Luhn check and sent it to /card.php. It replaced cryptocurrency addresses copied to the clipboard with eight hardcoded wallets, one per chain, and posted the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of cookies and a rendered screenshot of the page to /hit.php. On iPhone, iPad and touch-screen Mac user agents it loaded a stage called boot.js, and on iOS 18.6 and earlier it added a hidden iframe. A second route skipped the skimmer entirely: a 400-byte script at webshell[.]lol/get.js added boot.js to any page that ran it, with no device check.

A timeline from public records

Censys dated the operation from its scan history, certificate records and public blockchains. The first payload server, 34.96.213[.]201, appeared on Nov. 9 with three .icu domains on one certificate. The campaign's Ethereum wallet received its first seed payment on Nov. 12, a second staging server appeared on Nov. 14, and a certificate for the delivery domain was issued at 05:04 UTC on Nov. 16. The first page scan showing an affected site loading the delivery domain came at 08:25 UTC, and wallet receipts started at 10:31.

Censys campaign architecture diagram showing the victim browser, the compromised vendor script, the operator's track.js host, the MCH panel and Caishen kit, the rented webshell[.]lol loader service, the iOS exploit backend and the wallets and service deployments.
Image: Censys (fair use).Campaign architecture from the Censys analysis, showing who generates, serves and deploys each component.

Optimizely posted its statement at 01:02 UTC on Nov. 17. Between 03:30 and 05:22 UTC, both staging hosts and the implant command server went offline, and the Litecoin and Tron wallets were swept at 04:11 and 04:13 UTC to the operator's usual destination. Within about 24 hours, five new MCH panel hosts running one build went live on NETSEC-HK (AS45753), and the kit vendor re-listed its DarkSword packages on GitHub under a new Telegram contact. Public records showed 4,310.82 USDC leaving the Ethereum wallet on Nov. 16, 546.8 USDT moving from the Tron wallet to an aggregator, and five Bitcoin payments totaling 0.0853 BTC that remained unspent that night.

The kit, not the operator

Censys found the MCH panel next to the rest of the stack on a Los Angeles host, 64.83.19[.]114, which served the panel on port 8080, the Caishen exploit backend on 8081, storefronts on 8082 and 8090 and a stage loader on 8083. A second deployment ran on an Alibaba Cloud host in London, 8.208.35[.]123, with hostnames that follow a role scheme including mch, c2 and land.

Censys host record for 64.83.19[.]114 showing 11 services including HTTP on ports 8080 through 8083 and 8090, SSH and MySQL, on AS979 in Los Angeles.
Image: Censys (fair use).Censys Platform record for the service host 64.83.19[.]114, from the Censys analysis.

Both landing pages carry an injector block whose comment says it was generated by a script called patch_domains.py, and which sets a default channel code of 02111110 when no per-source code is supplied. The campaign's loader and skimmer carry that code. Censys warned that the match links the components to one panel but does not identify the operator, because more than a hundred deployments of the kit carry the same default.

The loader domain, webshell[.]lol, was registered in April 2024 and advertises webshells and black-hat search engine services under the handle BIBILZERODAY. Its Telegram channel's one substantive post, dated Nov. 9, moved customer contact to the Session messenger, the same day the first payload server appeared. Censys assessed with moderate confidence that the operator rented the loader from that vendor, while saying the evidence does not show they are the same person.

How to hunt for it

Censys published page-title queries for each tier: the MCH panel title, the Caishen iOS exploit backend title and the energy-rental storefront title. It also pointed to the strings patch_domains and the generator's Chinese-language config comment in served pages, a data-channel-code attribute set to 02111110 on a script tag, and random 15-character .icu domains serving boot.js. For sites that loaded the injected code, Censys said, removing the injected project code is the fix, and it noted Hudson Rock's report of an embedded fallback payload that runs when the delivery host is blocked, so blocking the domain alone is not enough.

About the Author

Ava Okello

Ava Okello covers detection engineering, EDR telemetry, and SOC hunting for SOCtember from London.

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